convergence

The Geography of Badness
to the next, particularly when the laws in question pertain to the ease and efficiency of money
laundering, capital will move in large quantities, an illustration of jurisdictional arbitrage at
its most efficient. A banking haven need not suffer from high levels of corruption to attract a
criminal element. In these jurisdictions, the rule of law manages to accommodate criminality,
perhaps because the corruption we find in these places does not manifest itself in a departure
from the legal codes. The corruption is written into the law itself.
Poverty
Closely linked to corruption, poverty is often but not always a feature of areas that become
criminal hubs. It seems beyond dispute that if the standard of living were higher and legitimate
vocational prospects were more plentiful in southern Afghanistan, say, or in Somalia,
we might expect fewer people to go into poppy cultivation or maritime piracy. But in part because
the global demand for narcotics and other forms of contraband tends to emanate from
prosperous developed nations, it would be a mistake to draw too strong a parallel between the
poverty of nations and their appeal to cross-border criminal elements. In a destitute country,
crime may appear to loom large because it is often one of the few viable revenue streams
available. But in fact, most illicit transnational activity unfolds in wealthy countries, where it
is simply obscured by the white noise of a booming legitimate economy. “In absolute terms,
transnational organized crime is strongest in the richest countries,” a recent UNODC report
points out, “but its share of total economic activity there is so small that it does not rise to
become a substantial threat.” 42
Here again we are confronted by the dynamic nature of criminal hubs: while poverty is
only sometimes a prerequisite for transnational organized crime in a given region, if poverty
is a problem in the place in question, criminal activity will often exacerbate it. Poverty may
drive young Somali men into maritime piracy, but as piracy renders the Somali coast unsafe,
it begins to diminish the likelihood that alternative lines of work, like fishing or shipping,
might be an option. Piracy also frustrates efforts by the international community to deliver
aid to Somalia by ship. These developments exacerbate the poverty, which, in turn, drives
more people into piracy.
The dynamics can become self-perpetuating to the point where organized crime can
actually derail international development programs. Epic quantities of aid money channeled
into Afghanistan are simply diverted outright by corrupt officials and siphoned out of the
country by cash couriers. Between 2007 and 2010, more than $3 billion in cash was openly
flown out of Kabul International Airport, a sum so vast that even allowing for legitimate
transfers by Afghans of honest cash and the profits drawn from drug-smuggling and other
illicit activities, it surely reflects large amounts of international money that was designated for
reconstruction. 43 In another example of the pernicious effects that organized crime can have
on economic development, a 2005 report by UNODC concluded that one explanation for the
relatively low levels of development investment in Africa is “the perception among investors
that the rule of law does not prevail” there. 44 Thus, as with state weakness, the relationship
between poverty and organized crime appears to be highly dynamic.
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