convergence
convergence
convergence
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Williams<br />
of no-go zone and slums and high violence areas representing another. This segmentation or<br />
“spatial transformation” into “safe” and “dangerous” localities dramatically manifests the stark<br />
juxtaposition of wealth and poverty in cities. 43 As such, it could well increase the long-term<br />
potential for violence.<br />
Unfortunately, the challenges of urbanization have not evoked a commensurate response.<br />
City governance, like state governance, is often corrupt, ineffective, and patchy at best. It is not<br />
surprising, therefore, that bottom-up or organic but informal governance mechanisms emerge<br />
as a substitute for governance from above. This is both positive and negative. It is positive in<br />
that it provides some degree of order, limited but real economic opportunities, and rudimentary<br />
services; it is negative in that the providers are often criminal organizations simply using<br />
paternalism to enhance their own security. This phenomenon is visible in the Cape Flats in<br />
South Africa where, as Andre Standing has noted, “the criminal economy delivers employment<br />
and goods to thousands of individuals who are socially excluded,” while the “criminal<br />
elite provides . . . ‘governance from below’ . . . by performing functions traditionally associated<br />
with the state.” 44 These functions include dispute settlement, a degree of social protection, and<br />
even private philanthropy that is at least a partial substitute for state provision of welfare. 45<br />
If anything, the phenomenon is more striking in the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, where<br />
the “dons” provide employment, services, and protection and in some cases “enjoy respect<br />
and greater legitimacy than formal state actors and institutions.” 46 In the favelas of Rio de<br />
Janeiro, the emergence of both the parallel economy and alternative forms of governance was<br />
well described by Elizabeth Leeds in the mid-1990s. Leeds emphasized that the organizers<br />
of the drug business “are first and foremost businessmen who are using the physical space of<br />
the favela . . . as the locus of operation for a highly lucrative informal-sector activity. For that<br />
space to be available and protected, they must offer something in return.” 47 In other words,<br />
the provision of employment, services, and protection is based on self-interest rather than<br />
altruism. Nevertheless, it has provided benefits to communities that have been ignored by the<br />
state apart from their victimization and exploitation by corrupt police forces. The long-term<br />
consequence of alternative governance, however, is that the legitimacy of the state is further<br />
eroded while the power of organized crime and other violent armed groups that are also service<br />
providers is greatly enhanced.<br />
Natural Resources and Global Climate Change<br />
Another factor that seems likely to be a source of disorder, criminality, and the expansion of<br />
illicit markets is the rapid depletion of global resources. Michael Klare, in a series of pioneering<br />
studies, has shown that natural resources such as oil, gas, and certain minerals and metals are<br />
becoming less readily available and, as such, are increasingly a source of contention both in<br />
interstate relations and within states as governments and corporations compete for what is left.<br />
In Klare’s words, this competition “will be ruthless, unrelenting, and severe. Every key player in<br />
the race for what’s left will do whatever it can to advance its own position, while striving without<br />
mercy to eliminate or subdue all the others.” 48<br />
Criminal organizations are likely to participate in this competition even if they are on<br />
the margins rather than at the center. In this connection, examples of criminal exploitation<br />
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