Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

Essentially, the Potsdam Declaration was an agenda both for the dismantling of the
German nation-state as it existed under the Nazis, including both punishments and reparations,
and the reconstruction of postwar Germany under, at least initially, Allied control.
Disagreements among the Allies themselves—including France, which had not been
an original signatory to this agreement—made its full implementation both difficult and
problematic, and resulted in its continuous modification.
Powell Doctrine. A U.S. doctrine enunciated in the 1990s regarding the use of overwhelming
U.S. force in military conflicts. Key tenets of the doctrine included the need to
provide the military services with a clear mission and with all the resources needed to
carry out the mission in an effective and successful fashion. Equally significant was the
tenet that overwhelming force should be used once the nation had embarked upon a war,
but as soon as victory was achieved there should be a disengagement of force. A concomitant
of the latter was that there was a serious risk in remaining as an occupation force
for too long after the military triumph.
The Powell Doctrine arose out of the first Gulf War (1991), during the administration
of U.S. president George H. W. Bush (b. 1924). At the time, General Colin Powell
(b. 1937) was chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989–1993). When Iraq
invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States faced a major policy
decision as to how to respond. At issue were several factors, most importantly, whether to
evict Iraqi forces and restore Kuwaiti independence or to end the occupation of Kuwait
and continue on to Baghdad and overthrow the government of President Saddam Hussein
(1937–2006). The debate that ensued split Bush’s key advisers, partly because they
realized the final decision would be crucial to the direction taken by U.S. foreign policy
in the Near East well into the future. During the course of the debate, General Powell
expressed his view that the U.S. military response should be limited to freeing Kuwait,
thus avoiding a protracted war in Iraq. It was clear that Powell feared another Vietnamstyle
commitment, a war that Powell had experienced and from which he had drawn
several important lessons. One was to avoid at all costs an unpopular war at home and not
to engage in a potentially unwinnable conflict (as in Vietnam), which could leave public
opinion in the United States disgruntled. In light of these considerations, Powell argued
for a short war, with victory achieved through the use of overwhelming power. President
Bush opted in favor of Powell’s logic. This determined the subsequent tactics and strategy
of the Gulf War, namely, the speedy eviction of the invaders from Kuwait, without an
ensuing pursuit of the Iraqi army across the border into Iraq itself. The doctrine of overwhelming
force enunciated by Powell at this time was expressed very clearly in a
comment he made about the U.S. tactics against the Iraqi military machine: “First we’re
going to cut if off, then we’re going to kill it.”
In an attempt to stave off demands for the U.S. military to take action in Bosnia in 1992,
Powell asserted, “If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration rather than clear analysis,
the situation can be made worse. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest
that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When
the ‘surgery’ is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes
forward with talk of just a little escalation—more bombs, more men and women, more
force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact, this approach has
been tragic.” And thus, the United States hemmed and hawed and wavered its way
through the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, acting like anything but a superpower.
POWELL DOCTRINE
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