Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

thinkers, either-or moralizing, ethnocentric). When coupled with governmental, economic,
military, and/or social power, prejudice, discrimination, and racism can escalate into violence,
mass murder, massacres, and, ultimately, genocide, though predicting early on
whether such a group in power will engage in any of these behaviors has proven extremely
difficult—if not impossible. Seemingly, the only possible counter to prejudice is that of
interactive education between different persons and groups supported by nation-state structures
committed to peaceful interactions among its citizenry.
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). Made public on May 3, 1994, PDD-25
was the formal peacekeeping doctrine developed by the U.S. administration (1994–2000)
of President Bill Clinton (b. 1946) in the wake of a catastrophic firefight (October 3–4,
1993) involving U.S. forces during a peacekeeping operation in Somalia. During the latter,
U.S. Army Rangers and Delta special forces were attempting to track down
Mohammed Farah Aideed (1934–1996), the leader of the Somali National Movement
(SNM) and its militia—the latter of which had recently killed twenty-four Pakistani UN
peacekeepers deployed in Somalia. However, instead of capturing their prey, the U.S.
troops were caught in a deadly ambush. Ultimately, eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed,
seventy-three were wounded, and a Black Hawk helicopter pilot was kidnapped. This
debacle ignited a congressional effort to limit U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping missions.
In reality, PDD-25 basically comprises a list of reasons as to why the United States
should avoid involvement in UN peacekeeping missions.
PDD-25 listed sixteen conditions that U.S. decision-makers were to consider as they
weighed whether the United States should support and/or become involved in UN peacekeeping
activities. Seven conditions were germane to any situation in which the United
States cast votes at the UN Security Council in regard to peace operations conducted by
non-U.S. military personnel. Six even more restrictive conditions were to be taken into
consideration should U.S. military personnel be involved in UN peacekeeping missions.
Three conditions dealt with any situation in which it was likely that U.S. military personnel
would have to engage in actual combat. Ultimately, PDD-25 specified that any
involvement by the United States in UN peacekeeping operations had to advance U.S.
interests, be essential for the success of the peacekeeping mission, and have the support
of both the U.S. Congress and the citizens of the United States. Furthermore, it specified
that the risk of fatalities had to be “acceptable” and that an “exit strategy” had to be
clearly delineated.
Presidential Guard. The Rwandan Presidential Guard, a unit of the Rwandan Government
Forces, basically constituted the “praetorian guard” of Hutu President Juvenal
Habyarimana (1937–1994). Although members of the Rwandan National Army (the
FAR), Presidential Guard soldiers were nonetheless a force with a different agenda from
the regular Rwandan troops. Answerable directly to President Habyarimana (and his successors),
their task was essentially just as much one of regime security as it was of national
defense. It was composed of extremist Hutu who were fiercely loyal to Habyarimana. The
Presidential Guard was highly trained, well equipped, and generally recognized as both
highly arrogant and aggressive. With the death of their president, the Presidential Guard
was a potent weapon ready to be unleashed in the president’s name, and, during the ensuing
genocide, was a key player among the murderers. More specifically, during the Rwandan
genocide of April–July 1994, the Presidential Guard aided, armed, and reinforced the
killing militias, particularly the Interahamwe (“those who stand together” and “those who
PRESIDENTIAL GUARD
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