Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

VIETNAM INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA
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Fearing a communist takeover of all of southeast Asia as one nation after another fell to
communist insurgents (the so-called domino theory), the U.S. troops first served as socalled
advisers to the South Vietnamese government in the latter’s battle with the North
Vietnamese, and later took on a full combat role in which fifty-eight thousand U.S. military
personnel would eventually be killed. U.S. troops not only faced an enemy well-versed
in guerrilla warfare, but one that was tenacious in its efforts and thoroughly dedicated to
its cause of overthrowing what it perceived as a corrupt regime (South Vietnam) in order
to replace it with a communist state. No matter what tactical efforts the U.S. government
tried, no matter how many bombs and napalm it dropped on the enemy and the jungles
where the war was fought, and no matter how many U.S. soldiers were thrown into the fray,
Vietnam was a quagmire from which the United States could not seem to free itself. Finally,
in 1975, knowing full well that if it did not pull out of Vietnam, the war (which was highly
unpopular among many U.S. citizens) would continue on for years, the United States
unceremoniously left South Vietnam to its own devices and in the lurch. Swiftly thereafter,
the war came to an end with the North Vietnamese the victors.
The “Vietnam analogy” was one that was truly believed by some to be germane to the
situation in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Others, though, used it for political
purposes. As Power (2002) notes, “The one word bogey ‘Vietnam’ became the ubiquitous
shorthand for all that could go wrong in the Balkans if the United States became militarily
engaged. For some, the war in Vietnam offered a cause for genuine concern, as they
feared any operation that lacked strong public support, implicated no ‘vital interests,’
and occurred on mountainous terrain. But many opponents of intervention proffered the
Vietnam analogy less because they saw a likeness between the two scenarios than
because they knew of no argument more likely to chill public enthusiasm for intervention”
(p. 284).
Vietnam Intervention in Cambodia. The violent and genocidal nature of the Khmer
Rouge regime in Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) between 1975 and 1979 caused
considerable unease among the country’s neighbors, none more so than Vietnam. Ethnic
Vietnamese within Cambodia were among the minorities targeted for destruction by the
Khmer Rouge throughout its rule, and in September 1977, Khmer Rouge troops had even
made an incursion into Vietnam itself, where they massacred 300 local civilians. This was
the worst of a number of border attacks, a situation that was kept secret by both sides for
several months. At the beginning of 1978, however, the situation escalated suddenly
when six Vietnamese divisions attacked Cambodia. The assault was repelled, but a year
later, in January 1979, a more determined Vietnamese offensive saw the capture of Phnom
Penh and the creation within a month of a pro-Vietnamese regime. Pol Pot (1925–1998),
the leader of the Khmer Rouge, was forced to take the remnants of his forces deep into
the jungles of western Cambodia, near the Thai border, where they reestablished their
communist regime at a more local level. Subsequently, his forces were supported by
Thailand and (as they had been for several years) China, and were a threat to the new
Vietnamese-backed Cambodian communist government. But, by this stage, the Khmer
Rouge had lost the support of the bulk of the Cambodian people. Indeed, it was dissent
within the Communist Party of Kampuchea, followed by dreadful and widespread retributive
party purges costing the lives of thousands, that provided the Vietnamese with
fertile ground to intervene in Cambodia in the first place. The Vietnamese intervention,
and the destruction of the Pol Pot regime it facilitated, saw an end to the Khmer Rouge’s