08.06.2013 Views

Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

Dictionary of Genocide - D Ank Unlimited

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

RAMBOUILLET CONFERENCE<br />

The major leaders <strong>of</strong> RTLM were tracked down in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> the genocide and<br />

indicted and tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on<br />

charges <strong>of</strong> genocide and crimes against humanity. They were sentenced to long terms <strong>of</strong><br />

imprisonment.<br />

Rambouillet Accords. Named for the chateau in the town in France where they were<br />

signed on February 23, 1999, the Rambouillet Accords resulted from a series <strong>of</strong> negotiations<br />

involving delegates from the United States, several European NATO countries (e.g.,<br />

Britain, France, Germany), and Russia, Yugoslavia, and representatives <strong>of</strong> Kosovar Albanian<br />

groups (in particular, the Kosovo Liberation Army). The meeting took place under<br />

the shadow <strong>of</strong> NATO threats <strong>of</strong> military action against the actors involved in the conflict,<br />

the Serbians and the Kosovar Albanians.<br />

The three-year interim agreement arranged at Rambouillet for Kosovo addressed the<br />

issues <strong>of</strong> a constitution, free and open elections, legal and legislative authority, democratic<br />

self-government, security, and a mechanism for final settlement between Serbia and the<br />

Kosovor Albanians. On the question <strong>of</strong> democratic self-government, it addressed such<br />

concerns as: health care; education; economic development; legislative, executive, and<br />

judicial branches <strong>of</strong> government and their protection; and national community institutions.<br />

On the question <strong>of</strong> security, it addressed the removal <strong>of</strong> Yugoslav troops from<br />

Kosovo, the deployment <strong>of</strong> international troops instead <strong>of</strong> the Kosovo Liberation Army,<br />

local law enforcement, and federal security. It was agreed that final settlement issues<br />

would be addressed at the conclusion <strong>of</strong> this interim agreement. The eight-chapter text <strong>of</strong><br />

the accord was divided along the following lines: Framework; (1) Constitution, (2) Police<br />

and Civil Public Security, (3) Conduct and Supervision <strong>of</strong> Elections, (4a) Economic<br />

Issues, (4b) Humanitarian Assistance, (5) Implementation I, (6) Ombudsman, (7) Implementation<br />

II and Appendices, and (8) Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and<br />

Final Clauses.<br />

Rambouillet Conference. A series <strong>of</strong> negotiations involving delegates from the United<br />

States, several European NATO countries including Britain, France, and Germany,<br />

together with Russia, Yugoslavia and representatives <strong>of</strong> Kosovar Albanian groups, took<br />

place in the chateau at Rambouillet, near Paris, between February 6 and March 19, 1999.<br />

The meeting took place under the shadow <strong>of</strong> NATO threats <strong>of</strong> military action in the<br />

event <strong>of</strong> an agreement not being made, but the very fact <strong>of</strong> getting everyone to a conference<br />

table was, at first, held to be a positive step. The intention was to hammer out a settlement<br />

that would be acceptable to all parties and would avoid the possibility <strong>of</strong> more<br />

bloodshed in the internal conflict that, until then, had been taking place—with much<br />

loss <strong>of</strong> life—between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. The negotiations focused, in spite <strong>of</strong><br />

the initial optimism, around a set <strong>of</strong> points that were ultimately unacceptable to one or<br />

other <strong>of</strong> the parties. The Kosovar Albanian delegates—who were disadvantaged by the<br />

fact that the groups they represented were still in the field fighting and out <strong>of</strong> regular contact<br />

with Paris—were absolutely unwilling to negotiate on anything that did not have an<br />

independent Kosovo as its end. The Serbs would not countenance the possibility <strong>of</strong> Kosovar<br />

autonomy (and even less, independence), nor would they accept any international interference<br />

in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs. Both sides wanted their way, but neither was prepared<br />

to allow their negotiating position to be held as being responsible for the failure <strong>of</strong><br />

the talks. Breaking through the impasse seemed impossible, until U.S. Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />

Madeleine Albright (b. 1937) provided both sides with a single option: in response to a<br />

355

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!