6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
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Ulf Haeussler<br />
defence sector computer networks complements 'ordinary computer hygiene, which keeps security<br />
software and firewalls up to date, and sensors, which detect and map intrusions' (id., 103). Defence<br />
sector networks rely on systems that, using (signals) intelligence warnings, 'automatically deploy<br />
defenses to counter intrusions in real time' (ibid.). 'They work by placing scanning technology at the<br />
interface of military networks and the open Internet to detect and stop malicious code before it passes<br />
into military networks' (ibid.). Moreover, the notion of active defence also covers the effort to detect<br />
intruders who have managed to escape detection at the interface (ibid.).<br />
In sum, the evolving U.S. approach of defensive resilience coupled with active defence and NATO's<br />
emerging notion of preventive deterrence seem to correspond harmoniously. As cyberstrategy<br />
development continues, the impact of NATO's and national approaches on the conduct of military<br />
operations in general and the conduct of hostilities in particular will require associated legal analysis.<br />
Rather than focusing on cyber operations in isolation, this analysis will have to consider that cyber<br />
warfare may become part of a spectrum of military responses available to the relevant policymakers<br />
(cf. Vamosi 2011).<br />
5. Conclusion<br />
From an international law perspective, the choices regarding cyber security and defence made by<br />
NATO's Strategic Concept 2010 correspond to questions related to the legality of use of force (jus ad<br />
bellum) and implicitly defer questions pertaining to the legal framework governing the conduct of<br />
hostilities (jus in bello) to future analysis. National cyberstrategy development points in the same<br />
direction. From an overall perspective, cyberstrategy development has the demonstrated potential to<br />
accelerate consensus building processes regarding the question of whether cyber attacks can be<br />
matters of national security and defence, including through effective deterrence, and in that capacity<br />
also trigger collective security and defence mechanisms like those based on the North Atlantic Treaty.<br />
At the same time, existing and evolving cyberstrategies do not yet provide all necessary insights<br />
regarding important questions such as how to leverage normative models of public health and<br />
environmental protection as well as the adaptation to cyberspaces' realities of the notions of<br />
combatancy and direct participation in hostilities, targetability of civilian objects turned military<br />
objectives, questions answer which still involves challenges in light of technical realities which may<br />
defy the development of prognoses required to develop an expectation regarding collateral damage<br />
and an anticipation of military advantage with a sufficient degree of predictability.<br />
References<br />
Gallis, P. (2003) NATO’s Decision-Making Procedure (CRS Report for Congress, Order Code', RS21510, 05 May<br />
2003), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf<br />
Gates, R.M., U.S. Secretary of Defense (2009) "The National Defense Strategy", Joint Forces Quarterly, issue<br />
52, 1 st quarter 2009, 1-7<br />
Häußler, U. (2010) "Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic<br />
Treaty", Tikk, E. and Talihärm, A.-M., International Cyber Security Legal & Policy Proceedings, 100-126<br />
Häußler, U. (2011) "Crisis Response Operations in Maritime Environments", Odello, M. and Piotrowicz, R.,<br />
International Military Missions and International Law (forthcoming: Brill, Amsterdam), 161-210<br />
Ilves, His Excellency Mr. T.H., President of the Republic of Estonia (2010) Opening Address at the June 2010<br />
Cyber Conflict <strong>Conference</strong>, http://www.ccdcoe.org/conference2010/329.html; cf.<br />
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B2AD4DE6-E0B91B4E/natolive/news_64615.htm?<br />
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia established by the <strong>European</strong> Union<br />
(2010), Report, Vol II<br />
Lynn, W.J. III "Defending a New Domain – The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy", Foreign Affairs Volume 89 Number 5,<br />
97-108<br />
NATO (1999) The Alliance's Strategic Concept dated 24 April 1999,<br />
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm<br />
NATO (2008) Bucharest Summit Declaration dated 03 April 2008,<br />
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm<br />
NATO (2009) Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration dated 04 April 2009,<br />
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease<br />
NATO (2010a) Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept 2010 dated 19 November 2010,<br />
http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf<br />
NATO (2010b) Lisbon Summit Declaration dated 20 November 2010,<br />
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm<br />
NATO Defence Planning Council (DPC) (2003) Decision Sheet, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p030216e.htm,<br />
cf. Press Release (2003)013 at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-013e.htm<br />
NATO NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) (annually updated publication) (quoted NATO Glossary)<br />
104