6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

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Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden randomized page requests to our server. This approach was not successful as it lead to gadget user PC to run out of memory. Upon investigation we realized this was caused by Google’s AdSense triggering upon each remote request. We realized that by slowing the request time one could effectively use this technique for AdSense abuse but as this was not our goal with this PoC we deactivated AdSense tracking. We ran the DDoS attack ten times on our own server. We used a single Google Gadget machine. Table 1: DDoS results shows that on average 638 requests were executed per second. According to server logs, eight unique Google domain servers were used to make the remote requests. Based on this data and data pertaining to a specific target server one can determine the number of Gadget users required to effectively take down a remote server. Unfortunately there is no fixed number of Gadget users that is required to disrupt a service. The number required is dependent on server architecture, request routing and data transferred per request. This PoC just determined the rough number of request that are possible using Google gadgets. Table 1: DDoS results Experiment Time per 1000 requests Requests per second 1 1.376 726.744 2 1.884 530.786 3 1.232 811.688 4 1.473 678.887 5 1.661 602.047 6 1.573 635.768 7 1.589 629.406 8 1.605 623.169 9 1.621 617.055 10 1.637 611.060 Average 1.56495 638.998 5. Future work This paper, merely wishes to illustrate the ease of generating a potential Botnet using services provided by Google Gadgets. In actuality the only true exploit was the fact that Google allows users to use Google servers to fetch remote content. The fact that Google gadgets require JavaScript in order to run, just facilitate the process of automating the attack. The whole spectrum of attacks on JavaScript can be used with Google’s services. The ability to execute code from Google’s computers can lead to other misdirection attacks. Google is not the only commercial player in the internet cloud space. Similar attacks may be possible from Microsoft, Yahoo or Amazon services. We aim to investigate this in future research. In this paper we did not investigate the possibility of AdSense revenue generation. By registering a impression based advertising mechanism, such as Adgator, one can generate revenue simply by delaying repetitive fetch requests a Botherder. More complex techniques are proposed by Hansen (2008) to add Clickthrough or Pay-Per-Click advertising schemes. The Botnet Gadget suffers from several critical weaknesses. Because the Botnet Gadget relies on Google Feedfetch agent to make remote requests it can easily be stopped by blocking all requests from this agent. But this will influence other legitimate FeedFetch agent request from Google reader. Another potential weakness is that Google gadget source code needs to accessible by Google Gadget Servers hence if a malicious gadget is detected Google could easily remove the Gadget and the Botherder would lose all its Bots. 6. Conclusion In this paper we reiterated the views of Stracener (2008) and Hubbard et al. (2010) that as the computer user base moves towards cloud computing so to will the security threats. We used Hubbard’s seven key threat indicators to try and identify possible routes of attack for our research. 40
Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden First, we defined the four key components of a Botnet. We then provided examples of how these components can be mimicked by Cloud services and specifically by Google’s gadget API and how they match the Cloud security threats identified by Hubbard. The API was capable of reproducing each of the components functionality, to a limited degree with very little alteration of freely available web resources. We combined these components to form a simple but working botnet. Although limited in scope, a simple DDoS attack was achieved by using Google servers as the attacking computers. The current botnets concentrate on using personal and corporate computers, but as they are moving into the cloud computing, the botnets will follow. We identified several weak points in our current design and identified some possible areas for future development of Cloud botnet research. This is still a rather new field and as such this paper hopes to serve as a possible point of reference for future work. References Banks, S. & Strytz, M., 2007. Bot armies: an introduction. [Online] SPIE Available at: http://spie.org/x15000.xml?ArticleID=x15000 [Accessed 10 October 2010]. Bullock, D., 2010. IP Address Geolocation JSON API. [Online] Available at: http://ipinfodb.com/ip_location_api_json.php [Accessed 8 October 2010]. Cabri, R., 2007. Spyjax - Your browser history is not private! [Online] Available at: http://www.techtalkz.com/news/Security/Spyjax-Your-browser-history-is-not-private.html [Accessed 7 October 2010]. Denis, B., 2008. Anatomy of the Asprox Botnet. [Online] VeriSign Available at: http://xylibox.free.fr/AnatomyOfTheASPROXBotnet.pdf [Accessed 30 September 2010]. Engate, 2009. Defending your network from Botnet threat. [Online] Engate Available at: http://ns1.happynet.com/images/datasheets/Engate_whitepaper.pdf [Accessed 9 October 2010]. Eston, T., 2010. DigiNinja. [Online] Available at: http://www.digininja.org/ [Accessed 5 October 2010]. Felix, F.C., Thorsten, H. & Wicherski, G., 2005. Botnet Tracking: Exploring a Root-Cause Methodology to Prevent Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks. Computer Security – ESORICS 2005, 3679, pp.319-15. Garner, 2008. Gartner Says Cloud Computing Will Be As Influential As E-business. Garner Inc. Stamfort: Garner Inc. Google Gadgets API, 2009. Working with Remote Content. [Online] Google Available at: http://code.google.com/apis/gadgets/docs/remote-content.html [Accessed 7 October 2010]. Google Webmaster Central, 2010. Feedfetcher. [Online] Google Available at: " http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=178852 [Accessed 3 October 2010]. Hansen, R. & Stracener, T., 2008. Xploiting Google Gadgets: Gmalware and beyond. [Online] Available at: http://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-16/dc16-presentations/defcon-16-stracener-hansen.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2010]. Hashemian, R.V., 2005. JavaScript Visitor IP Address and Host Name. [Online] Available at: I:\JavaScript Visitor IP Address and Host Name.mht [Accessed 3 October 2010]. Hubbard, D. et al., 2010. Top Threats to Cloud Computing V1.0. Cloud Security Alliance. Kiefer, K.P., 2004. Background on Operation Web Snare. [Online] Available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/2004/websnare.pdf [Accessed 3 December 2010]. Kortchinsky, K., 2009. Black Hat. [Online] Immunity, Inc. Available at: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bhusa-09/KORTCHINSKY/BHUSA09-Kortchinsky-Cloudburst-SLIDES.pdf [Accessed 16 November 2010]. MacManus, R., 2008. Read Write Web. [Online] Available at: http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/survey_48_of_bank_customers_wa.php [Accessed 6 October 2010]. Ollmann, G., 2009. A Botnet by Any Other Name. [Online] Available at: http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/501 [Accessed 11 October 2010]. Peterson, V., 2009. Social Design Best Practices. [Online] Available at: http://wiki.opensocial.org/index.php?title=Social_Design_Best_Practices [Accessed 3 October 2010]. Rutkowska, J., 2008. Black Hat. [Online] Coseinc Available at: http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa- 06/BH-US-06-Rutkowska.pdf [Accessed 16 November 2010]. Stracene, T., 2008. Securing Widgets and Gadgets in the Web 2.0 World. [Online] Available at: http://blog.cenzic.com/public/blog/208285 [Accessed 6 October 2010]. Vamosi, R., 2008. CNET News. [Online] Available at: http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-10040669-57.html [Accessed 2 October 2010]. Wang, A., 2009. Javascript Obfuscator . [Online] Available at: http://www.javascriptobfuscator.com/Default.aspx [Accessed 12 October 2010]. 41
Page 1 and 2: The Proceedings of the 6th Internat
Page 3 and 4: Contents Paper Title Author(s) Page
Page 5 and 6: Preface These Proceedings are the w
Page 7 and 8: Biographies of contributing authors
Page 9 and 10: Department of Computer Science, IQR
Page 11 and 12: Using the Longest Common Substring
Page 13 and 14: Jaime Acosta Some techniques that u
Page 15 and 16: Jaime Acosta assigned by an anti-vi
Page 17 and 18: Jaime Acosta Cormen, T.H., Leiserso
Page 19 and 20: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang tran
Page 21 and 22: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang ther
Page 23 and 24: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang the
Page 25 and 26: Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
Page 27 and 28: Deception Operations Security (OPS
Page 33 and 34: The Uses and Limits of Game Theory
Page 35 and 36: 3. Limits to using game theory 3.1
Page 37 and 38: Merritt Baer Effective cyberintrusi
Page 39 and 40: Merritt Baer 1.5), there seems to b
Page 41 and 42: Merritt Baer Report of the Defense
Page 43 and 44: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
Page 45 and 46: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden a
Page 47 and 48: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
Page 49: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
Page 53 and 54: Marco Carvalho et al. systems start
Page 55 and 56: Marco Carvalho et al. Benatallah, 2
Page 57 and 58: Marco Carvalho et al. management la
Page 59 and 60: Marco Carvalho et al. Figure 4: Sta
Page 61 and 62: Marco Carvalho et al. Sorrels, D.,
Page 63 and 64: Manoj Cherukuri and Srinivas Mukkam
Page 79 and 80: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. to see bo
Page 81 and 82: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. trivial.
Page 83 and 84: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. socially
Page 85 and 86: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. The views
Page 87 and 88: Vincent Garramone and Daniel Likari
Page 95 and 96: Stephen Groat et al. Sections 4 and
Page 97 and 98: Stephen Groat et al. probability fo
Page 99 and 100: Stephen Groat et al. host. In this
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Stephen Groat et al. changing addre
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Marthie Grobler et al. leadership,
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Marthie Grobler et al. apply to sta
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Marthie Grobler et al. 6. Working t
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Cyber Strategy and the Law of Armed
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Ulf Haeussler Alliance and Allies r
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Ulf Haeussler following the invocat
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Ulf Haeussler NCSA (2009) NCSA Supp
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen of respon
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen From a mi
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen productiv
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Intelligence-Driven Computer Networ
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Eric Hutchins et al. of defensive a
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Eric Hutchins et al. Defenders can
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Eric Hutchins et al. Equally as imp
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Eric Hutchins et al. X-Mailer: Yaho
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Eric Hutchins et al. Received: (qma
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Eric Hutchins et al. U.S.-China Eco
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Saara Jantunen and Aki-Mauri Huhtin
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver In t
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver Figu
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4. Evaluation Brian Jewell and Just
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver othe
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Detection of YASS Using Calibration
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Kesav Kancherla and Srinivas Mukkam
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M M M Su−2 Sv ∑∑ u= 1 v= 1 h(
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5.2 ROC curves Kesav Kancherla and
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Developing a Knowledge System for I
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Louise Leenen et al. We distinction
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Louise Leenen et al. There is growi
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3.1 Needs analysis Louise Leenen et
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Louise Leenen et al. Kroenke, D.M.
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. As we can se
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Figure 2: CALEA forensic model (Pel
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Table 2: Com
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Another pend
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Tree of Objectives Acknowledgements
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Secure Proactive Recovery - a Hardw
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. implementing
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. The coordina
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. multiplicati
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. Table 2: App
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2. Network infiltration detection D
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins on
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Ess
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Dev
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Muhammad Naveed Pakistan Computer E
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Muhammad Naveed response could also
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Muhammad Naveed Table 10: Aggressiv
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Muhammad Naveed 2006 Tcp Open Mysql
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Muhammad Naveed 8009 Tcp Open Ajp13
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Muhammad Naveed Austalian Taxation
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Alexandru Nitu world and bring it i
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Alexandru Nitu Article 51 restricts
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Alexandru Nitu As IW strategy and t
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Cyberwarfare and Anonymity Christop
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Christopher Perr attacks again help
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Christopher Perr about the current
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Catch me if you can: Cyber Anonymit
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft reve
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft sary
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Data (Evidence) Removal Shield Davi
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Neutrality in the Context of Cyberw
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan 18th cen
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan “Decla
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan von Glah
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Harm Schotanus et al. In the remain
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Harm Schotanus et al. 2.3.1 Secure
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Harm Schotanus et al. In this setup
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Harm Schotanus et al. the label (by
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Harm Schotanus et al. these aspects
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. they
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. User
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. SPIKE
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. A cl
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. in co
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. In th
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. Fuchs
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Figure 1: UPX packed Trojan Figure
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Trojan.Zb ot- 1342.mal Trojan.Sp y.
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Namosha Veerasamy and Marthie Grobl
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4. Conclusion Namosha Veerasamy and
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Tanya Zlateva et al. Computer Infor
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Tanya Zlateva et al. security and v
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Tanya Zlateva et al. court opinions
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Tanya Zlateva et al. 5. Pedagogy, e
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PhD Research Papers 277
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Level 3 all
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Shada Alsalamah et al. assure the a
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Shada Alsalamah et al. for Health I
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3. Hematology Laboratory System Who
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Pirnejad, H.
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Michael Bilzor a diverse base of U.
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Michael Bilzor In our current exper
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5. Execution monitor theory Michael
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Michael Bilzor design was run in si
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Michael Bilzor over testbench metho
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Evan Dembskey and Elmarie Biermann
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Page 313 and 314:
Page 315 and 316:
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Theoretical Offensive Cyber Militia
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Rain Ottis Last, but not least, it
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Rain Ottis an infantry battalion, w
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Rain Ottis Ottis, R. (2008) “Anal
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Work in Progress Papers 315
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Large-Scale Analysis of Continuous
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References William Acosta Abadi, D.
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Natarajan Vijayarangan top box unit
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Natarajan Vijayarangan The proposed
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