6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

Rain Ottis
Of the three models, the hierarchy probably takes the longest to establish, as the chain of command
and role assignments get settled. During this process, which could take days, months or even years,
the militia is relatively inefficient and likely not able to perform any complex operations.
5. Comparison
When analyzing the three models, it quickly becomes apparent that there are some aspects that are
similar to all of them. First, they are not constrained by location. While the Forum and the Cell are by
default dispersed, even a state sponsored hierarchical militia can operate from different locations.
Second, since they are organizations consisting of humans, then one of the more potent ways to
neutralize cyber militias is through information operations, such as persuading them that their
identities have become known to the law enforcement, etc.
Third, all three models benefit from a certain level of anonymity. However, this also makes them
susceptible for infiltration, as it is difficult to verify the credentials and intent of a new member.
On the other hand, there are differences as well. Only one model lends itself well to state sponsored
entities (hierarchy), although, in principle, it is possible to use all three approaches to bolster the
state’s cyber power.
The requirement for formalized chain of command and division of responsibilities means that the initial
mobilization of the Hierarchy can be expected to take much longer than the more ad-hoc Forum or
Cell. In case of short conflicts, this puts the Hierarchy model at a disadvantage.
Then again, the Hierarchy model is more likely to adopt a “peace time” mission of training and
recruitment in addition to the “conflict” mission, while the other two options are more likely to be
mobilized only in time of conflict. This can offset the slow initial formation limitation of the Hierarchy, if
the Hierarchy is established well before the conflict.
While the Forum can rely on their numbers and use relatively primitive attacks, the Cell is capable of
more sophisticated attacks due to their experience. The cyber attack capabilities of the Hierarchy,
however, can range from trivial to complex.
It is important to note that the three options covered here can be combined in many ways, depending
on the underlying circumstances and the personalities involved.
Conclusion
Politically motivated cyber attacks are becoming more frequent every year. In most cases the cyber
conflicts include offensive non-state actors (spontaneously) formed from volunteers. Therefore, it is
important to study these groups.
I have provided a theoretical way to categorize non-trivial cyber militias based on their organization.
The three theoretical models are: the Forum, the Cell and the Hierarchy. In reality, it is unlikely to see
a pure form of any of these, as different groups can include aspects of several models. However, the
strengths and weaknesses identified should serve as useful guides to dealing with the cyber militia
threat.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed here should not be interpreted as the official policy of the
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
References
Carr, J. (2009) Inside Cyber Warfare. Sebastopol: O'Reilly Media.
Denning, D. E. (2010) “Cyber Conflict as an Emergent Social Phenomenon.” In Holt, T. & Schell, B. (Eds.)
Corporate Hacking and Technology-Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications. IGI Global, pp 170-
186.
Krekel, B., DeWeese, S., Bakos, G., Barnett, C. (2009) Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct
Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation. Report for the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission.
Nazario, J. (2009) “Politically Motivated Denial of Service Attacks.” In Czosseck, C. & Geers, K. (Eds.) The Virtual
Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare. Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp 163-181.
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