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The Evolution of Information Assurance (IA) and Information Operations (IO) Contracts across the DoD: Growth Opportunities for <strong>Academic</strong> Research – an Update Edwin Leigh Armistead 1 and Thomas Murphy 2 1 Goldbelt Hawk LLC and Norwich University, USA 2 NorthLight Technologies, USA larmistead@gbhawk.com earmiste@norwich.edu tmurphy@rochester.rr.com Abstract: Four years ago, the authors presented a paper at the ICIW conference in Monterey, CA (Armistead & Murphy, 2007) that outlined opportunities for academics and researchers with regard to IO (Information Operations), IW (Information Warfare) and IA (Information Assurance) contracts across the Department of Defense (DoD) and Federal government (USG). The original paper highlighted a differential in contracts available and the current opportunities were at that time. Specifically, that paper predicted what the future may hold for further growth in these areas and how growth of IO, IA and IW contract vehicles can benefit universities and academics from a funding aspect. Finally, the original paper also suggested future areas of research that academics may be interested in exploring, to best optimize their ability to secure grants and contracts over the next few years. This paper is not only an update to the original research, to review the original hypothesis and determine if the predictions from four years ago were correct, but it also mines new data sources to take a fresh look at current contracts. In this research, the authors analyze the growing new opportunities in cyber warfare, strategic communications, psychological operations and cyber security. The scope of IO / IA is also expanding farther into areas of diplomacy, economics, and homeland security, while growing even more central to complex unconventional and conventional warfare applications. In addition, organizational change is accompanying these doctrinal and application area changes, which has led to a subsequent revision of the contract opportunities available. Likewise, new revisions of policy and documentation are also expected to arrive in the foreseeable future, which could lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of cultural values and psychological roles among the multiple political players. In this review, we explore what new and promising opportunities for collaboration exist for academics, and we hope that this paper can alert researchers to alternate opportunities for funding in the IO and IA arena that they may not have considered previously. Keywords: information assurance, information operations, Department of Defense, contracts, proposals 1. Introduction For many academics, funding is always a constant pursuit. With the current recession, grants and other non-profit opportunities may have become more limited than in previous time periods. In this era of fiscal constraint, this paper examines another method of obtaining funds for academics that should be considered. Specifically, the authors are interested in the opportunities that lay within the realm of DoD and Federal contracting, where academics can act as consultants to the companies that are supporting these entities. In some cases, this can be quite a lucrative venture, and if offers other avenues besides grants and academic scholarships, to offset the financial needs of the tenured scholar. Therefore, this paper reviews the types of research areas that have experienced the most growth, as well as areas that will experience future growth. We identify the DoD and Federal contractors that have the best success in obtaining contracts in the IA and IO areas. We give extensive details of the global and United States Government (USG) environment, which drive the security business as well. The authors also discuss how the USG and interagency interactions influence contracting policies and awards. Understanding all of the forgoing factors and strategies will allow the academic researcher to formulate targeted business plans to employ in their search for additional funding. 2. IA and IO business growth areas – players, relationships and influences The Federal IA segment is characterized by agency management that is policy, doctrine and reputation motivated. Civilian agencies IT security directives are driven by the magnitude, not by the quantity of events. Overriding political priorities mitigate new government-wide IT security legislation. Trade-offs of efficiency and effectiveness with security-privacy differs with department. 14
Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Murphy Agency Corporate Information Security Officers struggle with choosing to simply use a compliance scorecard or going farther to secure their enterprise. It is easier to say you are compliant than to prove you are secure. Both are necessary to deliver cost effective solutions. Department level initiatives drive security agendas. Each USG department has separate initiatives, which in turn drive their emphasis or lack of emphasis on IA. Trends in security focus following the path of Perimeter security, then Data security and most recently Coding security. This end-to-end focus on secure design, development and implementation is becoming common in all market segments. Information Systems Security Lines of Business is not expected to cannibalize short term vendor sales Demand for Integrated Security Services is growing. Standalone (Point) security opportunities are on the decline. Federal agencies still separate IT and physical services. Merger of IT and physical security is impeded by silos of excellence. Successful contract teams will be able to assist in integrating total security services. The Commercial IA segment of the security industry is characterized by an upper management that is litigation and profit motivated. Major trends are similar to the Federal segment. Secondly, there is a very rapid consolidation of best industry players. Cyber security firms are motivated to rapidly develop and offer full suites of integrated and managed services to meet the demand for full services. Large IT and network organizations can successfully merge with smaller IA firms if the ingenuity of the “pureplay” or point (individual security component supplier) IA firm is not lost. This is a particularly advantageous route to speed up the number and scope of offerings and to acquire experienced IA and Information Security (InfoSec) personnel who are in short supply. It is reasonable to expect similar motivation and actions in the Federal IA market for the same reasons. Thirdly, there are external factors, including a continuing rise in cybercrime, which follows the earlier increase in terrorism. Significant increases (greater than 200%) in cyber crimes occurred over the last two years. Over 100 million data records have been lost or stolen. The average cost of each data record loss is about $180/record giving a total estimate of $18 Billion lost over the period of two years, high motivation to client and criminal alike. There is also a modest trend toward offering cyber and physical security in packages of offerings. Agencies and firms increasingly outsource more security activities each year. They determine that they can achieve cost savings or a higher level of security at the same cost and tend to increase their outsourcing budgets over time. The firms that do outsource all or part of their IT security activities will see an increase in their level of security per dollar of investment. Surprisingly, although they don’t realize it, agencies and firms that outsource Security Services are also likely to benefit from each other’s decisions to outsource. IT security outsourcing has been shown to result in a reduction in the firms production costs and a freeing up of other resources. (Outsourcing refers to the relationship between a firm and another firm it pays to conduct security activities on its behalf). However, without careful planning and due diligence, the clients return on investment in outsourcing IT security could be reduced or become negative as a result of a variety of potential costs including both strategic risks (e.g., principal-agent problems), interoperability issues and other transactions costs. There are several emerging areas involving the “social” and risk management aspects of IA/IO. Clearly, “social” is used here to mean relationships among groups of agents, individual or organizations that involve proprietary information. At the firm level, there is a need to assure individual firms that their partners, suppliers, or any organization they communicate with over the Internet are trustworthy to a defined level acceptable to upper management. The economic benefit of securing all members of the business group is significant. At the individual level there is growing demand to secure interpersonal communications involving proprietary information (marketing, strategy and planning, budgets or financial), email, data and image exchanges, instant messaging, etc. This is also an area of vital national interest to DoD and other Federal agencies. In addition, the global environment influencing customers as well as the Federal and Commercial IA segments is characterized by significant stress. Negative pressure from the environment that Federal and Commercial organizations must perform under has increased significantly since 2007. The United States government (USG) and the global international community, nation states, state-sponsored nongovernment organizations (NGOs), organizations, groups, and individuals have rapidly moved into 15
Page 1 and 2: The Proceedings of the 6th Internat
Page 3 and 4: Contents Paper Title Author(s) Page
Page 5 and 6: Preface These Proceedings are the w
Page 7 and 8: Biographies of contributing authors
Page 9 and 10: Department of Computer Science, IQR
Page 11 and 12: Using the Longest Common Substring
Page 13 and 14: Jaime Acosta Some techniques that u
Page 15 and 16: Jaime Acosta assigned by an anti-vi
Page 17 and 18: Jaime Acosta Cormen, T.H., Leiserso
Page 19 and 20: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang tran
Page 21 and 22: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang ther
Page 23: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang the
Page 27 and 28: Deception Operations Security (OPS
Page 29 and 30: Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
Page 31 and 32: Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
Page 33 and 34: The Uses and Limits of Game Theory
Page 35 and 36: 3. Limits to using game theory 3.1
Page 37 and 38: Merritt Baer Effective cyberintrusi
Page 39 and 40: Merritt Baer 1.5), there seems to b
Page 41 and 42: Merritt Baer Report of the Defense
Page 43 and 44: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
Page 45 and 46: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden a
Page 53 and 54: Marco Carvalho et al. systems start
Page 55 and 56: Marco Carvalho et al. Benatallah, 2
Page 57 and 58: Marco Carvalho et al. management la
Page 59 and 60: Marco Carvalho et al. Figure 4: Sta
Page 61 and 62: Marco Carvalho et al. Sorrels, D.,
Page 63 and 64: Manoj Cherukuri and Srinivas Mukkam
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Manoj Cherukuri and Srinivas Mukkam
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Manoj Cherukuri and Srinivas Mukkam
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. to see bo
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. trivial.
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. socially
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. The views
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Vincent Garramone and Daniel Likari
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Stephen Groat et al. Sections 4 and
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Stephen Groat et al. probability fo
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Stephen Groat et al. host. In this
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Stephen Groat et al. changing addre
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Marthie Grobler et al. leadership,
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Marthie Grobler et al. apply to sta
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Marthie Grobler et al. 6. Working t
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Cyber Strategy and the Law of Armed
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Ulf Haeussler Alliance and Allies r
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Ulf Haeussler following the invocat
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Ulf Haeussler NCSA (2009) NCSA Supp
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen of respon
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen From a mi
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen productiv
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Intelligence-Driven Computer Networ
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Eric Hutchins et al. of defensive a
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Eric Hutchins et al. Defenders can
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Eric Hutchins et al. Equally as imp
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Eric Hutchins et al. X-Mailer: Yaho
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Eric Hutchins et al. Received: (qma
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Eric Hutchins et al. U.S.-China Eco
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Saara Jantunen and Aki-Mauri Huhtin
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver In t
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver Figu
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4. Evaluation Brian Jewell and Just
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver othe
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Detection of YASS Using Calibration
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Kesav Kancherla and Srinivas Mukkam
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M M M Su−2 Sv ∑∑ u= 1 v= 1 h(
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5.2 ROC curves Kesav Kancherla and
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Developing a Knowledge System for I
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Louise Leenen et al. We distinction
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Louise Leenen et al. There is growi
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3.1 Needs analysis Louise Leenen et
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Louise Leenen et al. Kroenke, D.M.
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. As we can se
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Figure 2: CALEA forensic model (Pel
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Table 2: Com
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Another pend
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Tree of Objectives Acknowledgements
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Secure Proactive Recovery - a Hardw
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. implementing
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. The coordina
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. multiplicati
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. Table 2: App
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2. Network infiltration detection D
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins on
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Ess
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Dev
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Muhammad Naveed Pakistan Computer E
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Muhammad Naveed response could also
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Muhammad Naveed Table 10: Aggressiv
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Muhammad Naveed 2006 Tcp Open Mysql
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Muhammad Naveed 8009 Tcp Open Ajp13
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Muhammad Naveed Austalian Taxation
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Alexandru Nitu world and bring it i
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Alexandru Nitu Article 51 restricts
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Alexandru Nitu As IW strategy and t
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Cyberwarfare and Anonymity Christop
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Christopher Perr attacks again help
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Christopher Perr about the current
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Catch me if you can: Cyber Anonymit
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft reve
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft sary
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Data (Evidence) Removal Shield Davi
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Neutrality in the Context of Cyberw
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan 18th cen
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan “Decla
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan von Glah
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Harm Schotanus et al. In the remain
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Harm Schotanus et al. 2.3.1 Secure
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Harm Schotanus et al. In this setup
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Harm Schotanus et al. the label (by
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Harm Schotanus et al. these aspects
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. they
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. User
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. SPIKE
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. A cl
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. in co
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. In th
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. Fuchs
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Figure 1: UPX packed Trojan Figure
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Trojan.Zb ot- 1342.mal Trojan.Sp y.
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Namosha Veerasamy and Marthie Grobl
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4. Conclusion Namosha Veerasamy and
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Tanya Zlateva et al. Computer Infor
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Tanya Zlateva et al. security and v
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Tanya Zlateva et al. court opinions
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Tanya Zlateva et al. 5. Pedagogy, e
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PhD Research Papers 277
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Level 3 all
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Shada Alsalamah et al. assure the a
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Shada Alsalamah et al. for Health I
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3. Hematology Laboratory System Who
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Pirnejad, H.
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Michael Bilzor a diverse base of U.
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Michael Bilzor In our current exper
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5. Execution monitor theory Michael
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Michael Bilzor design was run in si
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Michael Bilzor over testbench metho
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Evan Dembskey and Elmarie Biermann
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Theoretical Offensive Cyber Militia
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Rain Ottis Last, but not least, it
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Rain Ottis an infantry battalion, w
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Rain Ottis Ottis, R. (2008) “Anal
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Work in Progress Papers 315
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Large-Scale Analysis of Continuous
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References William Acosta Abadi, D.
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Natarajan Vijayarangan top box unit
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Natarajan Vijayarangan The proposed
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