6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Mecealus Cronkrite et al. with security requirements for government information systems. Security rests with the acquisition policy and contract, vendor management controls that they defined, a non-standard approach. However, the GAO has found that the federal government overall has major deficiencies information security. Mainly due to the lack of technical acquisition expertise needed to interpret and apply security requirements to contracts and the rigor and sustaining efforts required to keep validating vendor quality. (GAO-09-661T, 2009) Therefore increasing the federal IT workforce and capabilities, DHS NCCD can start to upgrade and improve the performance of security within the US government. Security requirements should be equally valued and balanced as e-government requirements in order to improve CI defence from disasters and attacks. Moreover, adding vendor non-compliance fines in the government IT acquisition process should increase the attention paid to CI systems. 5. Conclusions and future work There is a growing relationship between preventable software assurance failures and exposed critical cyber infrastructure risk. Preventable software defects remain unresolved at the peril of all software consumers and endanger the cyber infrastructure on which we all rely. The software consumer is uninformed and cannot self assure that the outsource software they order meets an acceptable standard. Making the security case clear enough to the public to understand is harder than making the case to the developer and the business manager through market forces. The growing black market economy of malware is exploiting the existing known defects in widely distributed commercial software. Targeting known common software defects is a primary vector to enter trusted networks and systems. Preventable programming errors make “zombie” slave computers accessories to organized crimes. The growing criminalisation of cyber attacks is driving the need for new controls in the previously unregulated software development culture. Without support, the business will tend to favour of profits over safety. It is the nature of profit motivation. Firms on their own will not decide to invest the socially optimal amount in cyber security because it conflicts with their own rational decision making criteria. However, by supported standards it enables the developer and publisher to mitigate preventable risk. Improving software assurance practices is one of the key countermeasures for protecting critical infrastructure. The industry needs to be motivated to encourage accountability and liability on behalf of the public good by avoiding common errors. This would also raise the barriers to entry on the software development market and ease the pressure on existing competitors who are able to adopt assurance practices, while legitimatizing IT as a new profession responsible for entrusted with the public good defending the critical cyber infrastructure. The proposed approaches examined a framework of increasing government and private controls on software quality and software assurance outcomes. Mandate Cyber Incident Reporting for CI industries to increase transparency and research ability. Enforce (Fines) for Federal IT Security development Non-Compliance to create better vendor compliance. Create better IDE tools that check for common programming errors, to help prevent the programmer from making common errors, and increase the resilience of the software infrastructure. Encourage professional licensing and non-repudiation for CCI Developers and Publishers to help to increase accountability and transparency in the publisher and developer community. The software industry will not be able to negotiate the safety standards process alone, without some government assistance. There is a need for standards based software professional accreditation to ensure the consistent application of basic security programming techniques and data privacy. However, the industry should not wait for legislation. Software publishers have the ability to seize the momentum of media awareness and establish accountability for code security within their corps. Acknowledgements This work is an extended study of our final team project of IST623 (Introduction to Information Security), taught by Prof. Joon S. Park, in the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University in Spring 2010. We would like to thank the class for valuable feedback, insight, and encouragement as we researched and developed this project during the semester. 74
Mecealus Cronkrite et al. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of, and should not be attributed to, the Department of Homeland Security or any of its agencies. References Assante, M.J. 2010, November 17. Testimony of Michael J. Assante, President and Chief Executive Officer National Board of Information Security Examiners of the United States Inc. Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs US Senate Hearing on Securing Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Stuxnet. Washington D.C. Baer, W.S. & Parkinson, A. 2007, "Cyberinsurance in IT Security Management,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 50-56. Baker, W., Goudie, M., Hutton, A., Hylender, c.D., Niemantsverdriet, J., Novak, c., Ostertag, D., Porter, c., Rosen, M., Sartin, B. & Tippett, P.,United States Secret Service 2010, July 28-last update, 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report [Homepage of Verizon], [Online]. Available: http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf [2010, 10/20] Council of Europe Counterterrorism Task Force 2007, Cyberterrorism-the use of the internet for terrorist purposes. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg Cedex, France CSI, “14th Annual 2009 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey” December, 2009, Computer Security Institute Falliere, N., Murchu, L.O. & Chien, E. 2010, October-last update, w32 Stuxnet Dossier [Homepage of Symantec], [Online]. Available: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dos sier.pdf [2010, 10/20] GAO May 5, 2009, GAO-09-661T: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities Place Federal Systems at Risk Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, GAO, Washington, D.C. Gelbstein, E. & Kamal, A. 2002, Information insecurity :a survival guide to the uncharted territories of cyberthreats and cyber-security, 2nd ed, United Nations ICT Task Force and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, NY. Goertzel, K.M., Winograd, T., McKinley, H.L., Oh, L., Colon, M., McGibbon, T., Fedchak, E. & Vienneau, R. 2007, July 23-last update, Software Security Assurance State-of-the-Art Report (SOAR) [Homepage of Joint endeavour by IATAC with DACS], [Online]. Available: http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/security.pdf [2010, 10/20]. Golumbic, M.C. 2008, Fighting terror online: the convergence of security, technology, and the law, Springer Verlag, New York. McGuinn, M. 2005, October 12-last update, Prioritizing Cyber Vulnerabilities, Final Report and Recommendations by the Council. [Homepage of DHS-NIAC], [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/NIAC_CyberVulnerabilitiesPaper_Feb05.pdf [2010, 10/20] . Mead, N.R., Allen, J.H., Conklin, A.W., Drommi, A., Harrison, J., Ingalsbe, J., Rainey, J. & Shoemaker, D. 2009, April-last update, Making the Business Case for Software Assurance [Homepage of Carneige Mellon Software Engineering Institute], [Online]. Available: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/09sr001.pdf [2010, 10/20]. Microsoft, “Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 9 (Jan 1 2010 - Jun 30 2010)2010”, [Homepage of Microsoft], [Online]. Available: http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/default.aspx [2010, 10/20]. McGurk, Sean 2010, Nov.17 Statement for the Record of Seán P. McGurk Acting Director, National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Office of Cybersecurity and Communications National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security Before the United States Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Washington, DC November 17, 2010 MITRE & SANS 2010, April 5-last update, CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors [Homepage of MITRE], [Online]. Available: http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/ [2010, 10/20]. NIAC, National Infrastructure Advisory Council September 8, 2009, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report And Recommendations, DHS, Washington, D.C. OECD, 2008. “Malicious Software (Malware) A Security Threat to the Internet Economy. OECD, Seoul, Korea. US-CERT, “Build Security In. (n.d.).Key Practices for Mitigating the Most Egregious Exploitable Software Weaknesses. Software Assurance Pocket Guide Series: Development” Volume II Version 1.3.2009, May 24-last update [Homepage of DHS-US-CERT], [Online]. Available: https://buildsecurityin.uscert.gov/swa/downloads/KeyPracticesMWV13_02AM091111.pdf [2010, 10/20]. US-CERT Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center and United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 2005, May 16-last update, Malware Threats and Mitigation Strategies [Homepage of DHS-US-CERT], [Online]. Available: http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/malware-threats-mitigation.pdf [2010, 10/20] Wang, Y., Zheng, B. & Huang, H. 2008, "Complying with Coding Standards or Retaining Programming Style: A Quality Outlook at Source Code Level", Journal of Software Engineering and Applications, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 88. Wilkes, J. 1997, "Business Ethics: A <strong>European</strong> Review, Focus: 'Protecting the Public, Securing the Profession:' Enforcing Ethical Standards among Software Engineers" 75
Page 1 and 2:
The Proceedings of the 6th Internat
Page 3 and 4:
Contents Paper Title Author(s) Page
Page 5 and 6:
Preface These Proceedings are the w
Page 7 and 8:
Biographies of contributing authors
Page 9 and 10:
Department of Computer Science, IQR
Page 11 and 12:
Using the Longest Common Substring
Page 13 and 14:
Jaime Acosta Some techniques that u
Page 15 and 16:
Jaime Acosta assigned by an anti-vi
Page 17 and 18:
Jaime Acosta Cormen, T.H., Leiserso
Page 19 and 20:
Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang tran
Page 21 and 22:
Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang ther
Page 23 and 24:
Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang the
Page 25 and 26:
Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
Page 27 and 28:
Deception Operations Security (OPS
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34: The Uses and Limits of Game Theory
Page 35 and 36: 3. Limits to using game theory 3.1
Page 37 and 38: Merritt Baer Effective cyberintrusi
Page 39 and 40: Merritt Baer 1.5), there seems to b
Page 41 and 42: Merritt Baer Report of the Defense
Page 43 and 44: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
Page 45 and 46: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden a
Page 53 and 54: Marco Carvalho et al. systems start
Page 55 and 56: Marco Carvalho et al. Benatallah, 2
Page 57 and 58: Marco Carvalho et al. management la
Page 59 and 60: Marco Carvalho et al. Figure 4: Sta
Page 61 and 62: Marco Carvalho et al. Sorrels, D.,
Page 63 and 64: Manoj Cherukuri and Srinivas Mukkam
Page 79 and 80: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. to see bo
Page 81 and 82: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. trivial.
Page 83: Mecealus Cronkrite et al. socially
Page 87 and 88: Vincent Garramone and Daniel Likari
Page 95 and 96: Stephen Groat et al. Sections 4 and
Page 97 and 98: Stephen Groat et al. probability fo
Page 99 and 100: Stephen Groat et al. host. In this
Page 101 and 102: Stephen Groat et al. changing addre
Page 103 and 104: Marthie Grobler et al. leadership,
Page 105 and 106: Marthie Grobler et al. apply to sta
Page 107 and 108: Marthie Grobler et al. 6. Working t
Page 109 and 110: Cyber Strategy and the Law of Armed
Page 111 and 112: Ulf Haeussler Alliance and Allies r
Page 113 and 114: Ulf Haeussler following the invocat
Page 115 and 116: Ulf Haeussler NCSA (2009) NCSA Supp
Page 117 and 118: Karim Hamza and Van Dalen of respon
Page 119 and 120: Karim Hamza and Van Dalen From a mi
Page 121 and 122: Karim Hamza and Van Dalen productiv
Page 123 and 124: Intelligence-Driven Computer Networ
Page 125 and 126: Eric Hutchins et al. of defensive a
Page 127 and 128: Eric Hutchins et al. Defenders can
Page 129 and 130: Eric Hutchins et al. Equally as imp
Page 131 and 132: Eric Hutchins et al. X-Mailer: Yaho
Page 133 and 134: Eric Hutchins et al. Received: (qma
Page 135 and 136:
Eric Hutchins et al. U.S.-China Eco
Page 137 and 138:
Saara Jantunen and Aki-Mauri Huhtin
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver In t
Page 147 and 148:
Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver Figu
Page 149 and 150:
4. Evaluation Brian Jewell and Just
Page 151 and 152:
Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver othe
Page 153 and 154:
Detection of YASS Using Calibration
Page 155 and 156:
Kesav Kancherla and Srinivas Mukkam
Page 157 and 158:
M M M Su−2 Sv ∑∑ u= 1 v= 1 h(
Page 159 and 160:
5.2 ROC curves Kesav Kancherla and
Page 161 and 162:
Developing a Knowledge System for I
Page 163 and 164:
Louise Leenen et al. We distinction
Page 165 and 166:
Louise Leenen et al. There is growi
Page 167 and 168:
3.1 Needs analysis Louise Leenen et
Page 169 and 170:
Louise Leenen et al. Kroenke, D.M.
Page 171 and 172:
Jose Mas y Rubi et al. As we can se
Page 173 and 174:
Figure 2: CALEA forensic model (Pel
Page 175 and 176:
Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Table 2: Com
Page 177 and 178:
Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Another pend
Page 179 and 180:
Tree of Objectives Acknowledgements
Page 181 and 182:
Secure Proactive Recovery - a Hardw
Page 183 and 184:
Ruchika Mehresh et al. implementing
Page 185 and 186:
Ruchika Mehresh et al. The coordina
Page 187 and 188:
Ruchika Mehresh et al. multiplicati
Page 189 and 190:
Ruchika Mehresh et al. Table 2: App
Page 191 and 192:
2. Network infiltration detection D
Page 193 and 194:
David Merritt and Barry Mullins on
Page 195 and 196:
David Merritt and Barry Mullins Ess
Page 197 and 198:
David Merritt and Barry Mullins Dev
Page 199 and 200:
Muhammad Naveed Pakistan Computer E
Page 201 and 202:
Muhammad Naveed response could also
Page 203 and 204:
Muhammad Naveed Table 10: Aggressiv
Page 205 and 206:
Muhammad Naveed 2006 Tcp Open Mysql
Page 207 and 208:
Muhammad Naveed 8009 Tcp Open Ajp13
Page 209 and 210:
Muhammad Naveed Austalian Taxation
Page 211 and 212:
Alexandru Nitu world and bring it i
Page 213 and 214:
Alexandru Nitu Article 51 restricts
Page 215 and 216:
Alexandru Nitu As IW strategy and t
Page 217 and 218:
Cyberwarfare and Anonymity Christop
Page 219 and 220:
Christopher Perr attacks again help
Page 221 and 222:
Christopher Perr about the current
Page 223 and 224:
Catch me if you can: Cyber Anonymit
Page 225 and 226:
David Rohret and Michael Kraft reve
Page 227 and 228:
David Rohret and Michael Kraft sary
Page 229 and 230:
Data (Evidence) Removal Shield Davi
Page 231 and 232:
Neutrality in the Context of Cyberw
Page 233 and 234:
Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan 18th cen
Page 235 and 236:
Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan “Decla
Page 237 and 238:
Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan von Glah
Page 239 and 240:
Harm Schotanus et al. In the remain
Page 241 and 242:
Harm Schotanus et al. 2.3.1 Secure
Page 243 and 244:
Harm Schotanus et al. In this setup
Page 245 and 246:
Harm Schotanus et al. the label (by
Page 247 and 248:
Harm Schotanus et al. these aspects
Page 249 and 250:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. they
Page 251 and 252:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. User
Page 253 and 254:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. SPIKE
Page 255 and 256:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. A cl
Page 257 and 258:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. in co
Page 259 and 260:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. In th
Page 261 and 262:
Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. Fuchs
Page 263 and 264:
Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
Page 265 and 266:
Figure 1: UPX packed Trojan Figure
Page 267 and 268:
Trojan.Zb ot- 1342.mal Trojan.Sp y.
Page 269 and 270:
Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
Page 271 and 272:
Namosha Veerasamy and Marthie Grobl
Page 273 and 274:
Page 275 and 276:
Page 277 and 278:
4. Conclusion Namosha Veerasamy and
Page 279 and 280:
Tanya Zlateva et al. Computer Infor
Page 281 and 282:
Tanya Zlateva et al. security and v
Page 283 and 284:
Tanya Zlateva et al. court opinions
Page 285 and 286:
Tanya Zlateva et al. 5. Pedagogy, e
Page 287 and 288:
PhD Research Papers 277
Page 289 and 290:
Shada Alsalamah et al. Level 3 all
Page 291 and 292:
Shada Alsalamah et al. assure the a
Page 293 and 294:
Shada Alsalamah et al. for Health I
Page 295 and 296:
3. Hematology Laboratory System Who
Page 297 and 298:
Shada Alsalamah et al. Pirnejad, H.
Page 299 and 300:
Michael Bilzor a diverse base of U.
Page 301 and 302:
Michael Bilzor In our current exper
Page 303 and 304:
5. Execution monitor theory Michael
Page 305 and 306:
Michael Bilzor design was run in si
Page 307 and 308:
Michael Bilzor over testbench metho
Page 309 and 310:
Evan Dembskey and Elmarie Biermann
Page 311 and 312:
Page 313 and 314:
Page 315 and 316:
Page 317 and 318:
Theoretical Offensive Cyber Militia
Page 319 and 320:
Rain Ottis Last, but not least, it
Page 321 and 322:
Rain Ottis an infantry battalion, w
Page 323 and 324:
Rain Ottis Ottis, R. (2008) “Anal
Page 325 and 326:
Work in Progress Papers 315
Page 327 and 328:
Large-Scale Analysis of Continuous
Page 329 and 330:
References William Acosta Abadi, D.
Page 331 and 332:
Natarajan Vijayarangan top box unit
Page 333 and 334:
Natarajan Vijayarangan The proposed
show all

6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?