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Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Murphy fray, suggesting that understanding the contract, the contractor and developing strong relationships with contractors is essential. We give substantial details on how and why one develops strong relationships. We call attention to the area of Strategic Communications as a possible future area of opportunity given the broader scope of integration and application of security contract focus. Finally, we mention several future areas of research, giving the assumptions made as well as details of selected difficult but very important technical, complex predictive modeling and MOE/MOP areas that need to be solved. References Armistead, E., & Murphy, T. (2007). The Evolution of Information Assurance and Information Operations Contracts across the DoD: Growth Opportunities for <strong>Academic</strong> Research. ICIW <strong>Conference</strong>. Monterey, CA. Armistead, L. (2010). Information Operations Matters - Best Practices. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc. Carr, J. (2009). Inside Cyber Warfare. O'Reilly. Clarke, R. A., & Knake, R. K. (2010). Cyber War - The Next Threat to National Security and What to do About It. New York, NY: HarperCollins. INPUT. (2010). INPUT database, INPUT. Retrieved 2010, from "The Authority on Government Business" [Online]: http://www.input.com Paul, C. ( 2010). “ Strategic Communication” Is Vague, Say What You Mean. Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 56 . Tokar, J. (2010). Assessing Operations:MOP and MOE Development. IO Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 3 , 25-28. 22
The Uses and Limits of Game Theory in Conceptualizing Cyberwarfare Merritt Baer Harvard Law School, Cambridge, USA mbaer@post.harvard.edu Abstract: In cyberwarfare, there are obstacles to reaching minimax stasis: unlike in checkers, game theory cannot follow each decision path to its conclusion and then trace the right decisions back. However, I contend that because the rational predictability of game theory will continue to drive decisions and seek out patterns in them, game theory may identify (and intelligently weight) nodes of a decision tree that are not immediately recognizable to or favored by human decision-makers. While we can‟t create a network that is maximally resistant to random faults and maximally resistant to targeted faults, we can take into account the particular weaknesses and likelihoods of attack so that the weaknesses overlap in resistant ways-- ways that correspond to risk preferences and security priorities. Moreover, using game theory to make a security strategy that is a calculated derivative of mapped potential outcomes will help us to avoid human biases and to respond to threats proportionately/economically. Rather than a process of continual growth, cyber evolution, like biological evolution, seems more aptly characterized as punctuated equilibrium—periods of relative stasis followed by quick, drastic periods of breakthrough. Reaching Nash equilibrium is unlikely in the cyberwar context because under unstable conditions, evolutionarily stable strategies don‟t run a typical course. While there may be no set of moves that is a “solution” in cyberwar strategy, game theory allows human decisionmakers to intelligently identify and weight decision paths to transcend cognitive biases. This paper seeks to change the way of thinking about cyberwar-- from one of stockpiling weapons, to one of looking for patterns-- thinking about the problem of cyber insecurity more holistically. The paper challenges some of the myopia in thinking about cyber in existing "warfare" terms and proposes that organic models‟ tendency toward game theoretic equilibrium may help us conceive of the cyberwar decisionmaking landscape more effectively. Keywords: cyberwarfare, game theory, layered defense, Nash equilibrium 1. Introduction In this paper I explore the applications and limitations of game theory to cyberwarfare at a conceptual, not case study, level. My focus is on federal strategy—especially the United States Department of Defense (DoD)—so I do not focus on addressing cybercrime or cyberattack that has as its purpose money or a local, ideological message, or even those with cyber -terrorist or -anarchist goals. My focus is on large-scale acts of war aimed at military, governmental or infrastructural targets that currently only certain nation-states are likely to be able to execute, thus the other “players” in the game are nation-state-level actors. I recognize that cyberwarfare is among the rarer forms of online violence in comparison with other forms of cybercrime, but its high stakes and opportunities for more contained strategic study attracted my focus. For the purposes of this paper, I assume we have available all existing sophisticated game theoreticians, human or computerized. I find that game theory is useful to the extent that it allows us to transcend some of our systemspecific biases (based on established or institutional ways of approaching problems) and threatspecific biases (rooted in evolutionarily-derived disproportionate reactions to certain threats). Game theory can allow us to weigh the nodes of the decision tree more accurately; it is not a solution as such, but a tool for holistic cyberwarfare strategy. 2. Background: Nash equilibrium and complications to game-theoretical stasis in the cyber context Game theory scholars have written, though not extensively, on the application of game theory to information warfare. (See, e.g., Hamilton et al, “The Role of Game Theory in Information Warfare” and “Challenges to Applying Game Theory to Information Warfare”). The US Cyber Consequences Unit (US-CCU) claims it primarily employs an analytic method called “Value Creation Analysis” that “draws…broadly on cooperative game theory.” (See US-CCU website, "http://www.usccu.us/" http://www.usccu.us/). Two-player stochastic games may be useful in the escalation context (deciding whether to launch a preemptive attack or responding to an attack could be a two-player interaction). A study by SPIE has 23
Page 1 and 2: The Proceedings of the 6th Internat
Page 3 and 4: Contents Paper Title Author(s) Page
Page 5 and 6: Preface These Proceedings are the w
Page 7 and 8: Biographies of contributing authors
Page 9 and 10: Department of Computer Science, IQR
Page 11 and 12: Using the Longest Common Substring
Page 13 and 14: Jaime Acosta Some techniques that u
Page 15 and 16: Jaime Acosta assigned by an anti-vi
Page 17 and 18: Jaime Acosta Cormen, T.H., Leiserso
Page 19 and 20: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang tran
Page 21 and 22: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang ther
Page 23 and 24: Hind Al Falasi and Liren Zhang the
Page 25 and 26: Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
Page 27 and 28: Deception Operations Security (OPS
Page 29 and 30: Edwin Leigh Armistead and Thomas Mu
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Page 35 and 36: 3. Limits to using game theory 3.1
Page 37 and 38: Merritt Baer Effective cyberintrusi
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Page 41 and 42: Merritt Baer Report of the Defense
Page 43 and 44: Ivan Burke and Renier van Heerden F
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. socially
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Mecealus Cronkrite et al. The views
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Vincent Garramone and Daniel Likari
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Stephen Groat et al. Sections 4 and
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Stephen Groat et al. probability fo
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Stephen Groat et al. host. In this
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Stephen Groat et al. changing addre
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Marthie Grobler et al. leadership,
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Marthie Grobler et al. apply to sta
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Marthie Grobler et al. 6. Working t
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Cyber Strategy and the Law of Armed
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Ulf Haeussler Alliance and Allies r
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Ulf Haeussler following the invocat
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Ulf Haeussler NCSA (2009) NCSA Supp
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen of respon
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen From a mi
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Karim Hamza and Van Dalen productiv
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Intelligence-Driven Computer Networ
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Eric Hutchins et al. of defensive a
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Eric Hutchins et al. Defenders can
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Eric Hutchins et al. Equally as imp
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Eric Hutchins et al. X-Mailer: Yaho
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Eric Hutchins et al. Received: (qma
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Eric Hutchins et al. U.S.-China Eco
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Saara Jantunen and Aki-Mauri Huhtin
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver In t
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver Figu
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4. Evaluation Brian Jewell and Just
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Brian Jewell and Justin Beaver othe
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Detection of YASS Using Calibration
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Kesav Kancherla and Srinivas Mukkam
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M M M Su−2 Sv ∑∑ u= 1 v= 1 h(
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5.2 ROC curves Kesav Kancherla and
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Developing a Knowledge System for I
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Louise Leenen et al. We distinction
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Louise Leenen et al. There is growi
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3.1 Needs analysis Louise Leenen et
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Louise Leenen et al. Kroenke, D.M.
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. As we can se
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Figure 2: CALEA forensic model (Pel
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Table 2: Com
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Jose Mas y Rubi et al. Another pend
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Tree of Objectives Acknowledgements
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Secure Proactive Recovery - a Hardw
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. implementing
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. The coordina
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. multiplicati
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Ruchika Mehresh et al. Table 2: App
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2. Network infiltration detection D
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins on
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Ess
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David Merritt and Barry Mullins Dev
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Muhammad Naveed Pakistan Computer E
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Muhammad Naveed response could also
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Muhammad Naveed Table 10: Aggressiv
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Muhammad Naveed 2006 Tcp Open Mysql
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Muhammad Naveed 8009 Tcp Open Ajp13
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Muhammad Naveed Austalian Taxation
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Alexandru Nitu world and bring it i
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Alexandru Nitu Article 51 restricts
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Alexandru Nitu As IW strategy and t
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Cyberwarfare and Anonymity Christop
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Christopher Perr attacks again help
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Christopher Perr about the current
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Catch me if you can: Cyber Anonymit
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft reve
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David Rohret and Michael Kraft sary
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Data (Evidence) Removal Shield Davi
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Neutrality in the Context of Cyberw
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan 18th cen
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan “Decla
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Julie Ryan and Daniel Ryan von Glah
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Harm Schotanus et al. In the remain
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Harm Schotanus et al. 2.3.1 Secure
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Harm Schotanus et al. In this setup
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Harm Schotanus et al. the label (by
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Harm Schotanus et al. these aspects
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. they
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. User
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. SPIKE
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. A cl
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. in co
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. In th
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Maria Semmelrock-Picej et al. Fuchs
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Figure 1: UPX packed Trojan Figure
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Trojan.Zb ot- 1342.mal Trojan.Sp y.
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Madhu Shankarapani and Srinivas Muk
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Namosha Veerasamy and Marthie Grobl
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4. Conclusion Namosha Veerasamy and
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Tanya Zlateva et al. Computer Infor
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Tanya Zlateva et al. security and v
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Tanya Zlateva et al. court opinions
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Tanya Zlateva et al. 5. Pedagogy, e
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PhD Research Papers 277
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Level 3 all
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Shada Alsalamah et al. assure the a
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Shada Alsalamah et al. for Health I
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3. Hematology Laboratory System Who
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Shada Alsalamah et al. Pirnejad, H.
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Michael Bilzor a diverse base of U.
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Michael Bilzor In our current exper
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5. Execution monitor theory Michael
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Michael Bilzor design was run in si
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Michael Bilzor over testbench metho
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Evan Dembskey and Elmarie Biermann
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Theoretical Offensive Cyber Militia
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Rain Ottis Last, but not least, it
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Rain Ottis an infantry battalion, w
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Rain Ottis Ottis, R. (2008) “Anal
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Work in Progress Papers 315
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Large-Scale Analysis of Continuous
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References William Acosta Abadi, D.
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Natarajan Vijayarangan top box unit
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Natarajan Vijayarangan The proposed
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