6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
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Alexandru Nitu<br />
leading to human casualties or material damage. In the case of IHL, the motivation for the application<br />
of the law is to limit the damage and provide care for the casualties. This would support an expansive<br />
interpretation of when IHL begins to apply. If a cyber attack is directed against an enemy in order to<br />
cause physical damage or loss of life, it can hardly be disputed that such an attack is in fact a method<br />
of warfare and is subject to limitations under IHL. (Dörmann 2004)<br />
3.2 The principle of distinction<br />
Just as information warfare attacks may be difficult to encompass within the ‘use of force’ concept, it<br />
may be also difficult to define their targets as military (and thus generally legitimate targets) or civilian<br />
(generally forbidden). The dual-use nature of many telecommunications networks complicates the<br />
questions of the applicability of IHL as a constraint on information warfare, because the intangible<br />
damage that cyber attacks cause may not be the sort of injuries against which the humanitarian law of<br />
war is designed to protect noncombatants. (Greenberg 1998)<br />
The definition of the term “attack” is of decisive importance for the application of the various rules<br />
giving effect to the principle of distinction and for most of the rules providing special protection for<br />
certain objects. In accordance with Art. 49 (1) of AP I, ‘attacks’ means acts of violence against the<br />
adversary, whether in offence or in defense (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977). If<br />
the term ‘acts of violence’ denotes only physical force, the concept of ‘attacks’ excludes dissemination<br />
of propaganda, embargoes or other non-physical means of psychological, political or economic<br />
warfare. (Dörmann 2004)<br />
Based on that understanding and distinction, cyber attacks through viruses, worms, logic bombs etc.<br />
that result in physical damage to persons, or damage to objects that goes beyond the computer<br />
program or data attacked can be qualified as ‘acts of violence’ and thus as an attack in the sense of<br />
IHL. From this point of view, it is helpful to look at how the concept of attack is applied to other means<br />
and methods of warfare. There is general agreement that, for example, the employment of biological<br />
or chemical agents that does not cause a physical explosion, such as the use of asphyxiating or<br />
poisonous gases, would constitute an attack (Dörmann 2004).<br />
If one admits that employing a IW method constitute an attack, AP I imposes:<br />
The obligation to direct attacks only against "military objectives" and not to attack civilians or<br />
civilian objects; (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977, Art. 48, 51 (2), 52)<br />
The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, including attacks that may be expected to cause<br />
excessive incidental civilian casualties or damages; (Protocol Additional to the Geneva<br />
Conventions 1977, Art. 51 (4), (5))<br />
The requirement to take the necessary precautions to ensure that the previous two rules are<br />
respected, (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977, Art. 57) in particular the<br />
requirement to minimize incidental civilian damage and the obligation to abstain from attacks if<br />
such damage is likely to be excessive to the value of the military objective to be attacked;<br />
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977, Art. 51 (5)(b), 57 (2)(a)(ii) and (iii))<br />
These rules operate in exactly the same way whether the attack is carried out using traditional<br />
weapons or IW techniques. Problems that arise in applying these rules are therefore not necessarily<br />
unique to IW. They are more related to the interpretation of, for example, what constitutes a military<br />
objective or which collateral damage would be excessive.<br />
4. Legal perspectives on IW<br />
The laws of war always faced two challenges. The first was that war's confrontational nature and<br />
tremendously high stakes often frustrated efforts to set reasonable limits on behavior. Fortunately, the<br />
international community has generated international conventions and war crimes tribunals to solve<br />
this problem.<br />
The laws of war also face a second challenge, which is how to adapt these laws to technological<br />
change. This dynamic itself is as old as civilization, but it became more acute in the last one hundred<br />
years, since technological progress has accelerated. The result is that weapons are developing much<br />
faster than international law, and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue to<br />
accelerate in the future.<br />
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