6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

Christopher Perr
attacks again helped to show how vulnerable we are to even unsophisticated cyber attacks (U.S. eyes
N. Korea for ‘massive’ cyber attacks, 2010).
5. The current state of our cyber doctrine
It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.
Albert Einstein
The opening of this paper ends with a pretty controversial statement, and is done so with a purpose.
The case with Iran and Syria show how a dependence on technology can seriously threaten a nation.
Evidence exists to show that the United States might be in a position where we are overly dependent
on technology in key areas with a limited ability to defend ourselves. Our current policies regarding
cyber warfare serve as the main cause.
The most recent example to support this statement is in the written answers which General Keith
Alexander, the nominee for commander of the new Cyber Command, provided to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 15 April 2010. In one question he answered
“President Obama’s cybersecurity sixty-day study highlighted the mismatch between our
technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies, and our
civilian leadership is working hard to resolve the mismatch (Markoff, 2010).”
General Alexander’s response highlights an ongoing issue in the Department of Defense and, since
the vulnerability to the United States extends into the civil realm, in public policy as well. General
Alexander also speaks to the large gap created by having very effective offensive cyber capabilities
without developed defensive capabilities.
The 2003 Information Operations Roadmap served as the initial White House level guide for how the
armed forces conduct information operations (Miller, 2010). This document is very general and at a
level above specifics about cyber-warfare, but some important information can be gleaned from it.
First, cyber warfare is treated as an extension of information and conventional operations. Second, it
was decided that our current policy and force preparedness was not at a level capable of meeting the
countries cyber needs. Third, the civil realm of cyber operations was almost completely ignored
except to say that there could be some effect from operations and as such considerations should be
weighed.
The only other repeating theme in the document was to note the need to “deny, degrade, disrupt or
destroy a broad range of adversary threats, sensors, command and control and critical support
infrastructure.” This seems to assume that when cyber comes into play, it will be only against another
country that has a similar dependence on technology as the United States. This document also
highlights how the term “cyber war” can be incredibly limiting, and neglects a lot of the tactics and
resources which could be utilized if cyber operations were not limited to ‘conventional war’ alone.
The first main theme is vital to understand, and is echoed in a recent article in the Air and Space
Power Journal “Cyber This, Cyber That...So What? (Trias, 2010)” This article discusses integrating
cyberspace operations as well as counter cyberspace with everything from special operations to aerial
refueling is greatly advocated. Due to the pervasive nature of cyberspace almost all doctrine should
be looked at to at least include defensive elements of cyber security, and could probably benefit from
looking to how offensive cyber operations could aid in mission effectiveness.
The article also recognizes how slow going and agonizing the process of updating doctrine without
clear policy guidance can be.
“Air Force strategists are struggling to create doctrinal principles for cyber warfare in the
form of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-11, “Cyberspace Operations,” now
several years in draft.” (Trias, 2010)
The reason the Air Force could be having such a difficult time is linked to our second issue. In
response to the Information Operation Roadmap some major changes began to take place in the
cyber realm. New commands and squadrons were stood up across the Department of Defense (DoD)
in what from the outside looked like a power grab, and in eventual response it was decided that there
needed to be a new joint command created to oversee cyber operations and defense, and to track
capabilities and assets in the DoD.
209