6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
6th European Conference - Academic Conferences
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Alexandru Nitu<br />
world and bring it into an intangible, electronic one. Effects previously attainable only through physical<br />
destruction are now accomplished remotely with the silent means of information technology.<br />
These new ways of fighting have been labeled Information Warfare (IW). Definitions and conceptions<br />
of IW are numerous, but generally entail preserving one’s own information and information technology<br />
while exploiting, disrupting, or denying the use of an adversary’s (Shackelford 2009). In US military<br />
doctrine, IW it is part of a much larger strategic shift that was named Information Operations (IO).<br />
Information Operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems<br />
while defending one’s own information and information systems. Information Operations apply across<br />
all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations, and at every level of war.<br />
Information Warfare is Information Operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict, including<br />
war, to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries (Joint Chiefs of<br />
Staff 1998).<br />
The new emerging vulnerabilities that information age generates are more likely to be exploited by<br />
opponents of developed states that cannot hope to prevail on the battlefield, or even at the<br />
negotiations table. A lesser-advantaged state hoping to seriously harm a dominant adversary must<br />
inevitably compete asymmetrically. It must seek to counter the strengths of the opponent not head-on,<br />
but rather employing unorthodox means to strike at centers of gravity.<br />
IW offers such asymmetrical benefits. In the first place, in many cases a computer network attack will<br />
either not merit a response involving the use of force, or the legality of such a response could be<br />
debatable, even if the victim is able to accurately identify the attack and its source. Thus, because of<br />
the potentially grave impact of cyber attacks on a state’s infrastructure, it can prove a high gain, low<br />
risk option for a state outclassed militarily or economically. Moreover, to the extent that an opponent is<br />
militarily and economically advantaged, it is probably technologically dependent, and, therefore,<br />
teeming with tempting targets.<br />
2. IW and the ‘use of force’ concept<br />
Several rules govern when force can be used (the jus ad bellum, which focuses on the criteria for<br />
going to war, covering issues such as right purpose, duly constituted authority, last resort) and how<br />
states can use that force in an armed conflict (the jus in bello or ‘law of war’, that creates the concept<br />
of just war-fighting, covering discrimination, proportionality, humanity etc). These rules have diverse<br />
sources, including the U.N. Charter, international humanitarian law treaties, including the 1949<br />
Geneva Conventions, as well as customary international humanitarian law. Some of these existing<br />
laws involve principles of general applicability that could encompass IW. Nevertheless, the gap<br />
between physical weaponry (whether kinetic, biological, or chemical) and IW’s virtual methods can be<br />
substantial, creating translation problems.<br />
The sort of intangible damage that IW attacks may cause is analytically different from the physical<br />
damage caused by the use of armed force in traditional warfare. The kind of destruction that bombs<br />
and bullets cause is easy to see and understand, and fits well within longstanding views of what war<br />
means. In contrast, the disruption of information systems, including the corruption or manipulation of<br />
stored or transmitted data, may cause intangible damage, such as disruption of civil society or<br />
government services. These may be more closely equivalent to activities such as economic sanctions<br />
that may be undertaken in times of peace rather than acts of aggression (Greenberg 1998).<br />
Whether or not an information warfare attack can be considered ‘use of force’ or ‘aggression’ is<br />
relevant to the fact that a forceful response can be justified as self-defense, as well as to the issue of<br />
whether a particular response would be proportionate to the original attack.<br />
Modern law on the use of force is based on the U.N. Charter. An analysis of international law and IW<br />
could begin with the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4): ‘All Members shall refrain in their<br />
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political<br />
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United<br />
Nations’ (Charter of the United Nations, Art.2(4)). The drafters intended to prohibit all types of force,<br />
except those carried out under the aegis of the United Nations or as provided for by the Security<br />
Council, and wanted to restrict the use of force severely by sharply limiting its use to situations<br />
approved by the Security Council (Barkham 2001).<br />
201