6th European Conference - Academic Conferences

Cyberwarfare and Anonymity
Christopher Perr
Auburn University, USA
cwp0002@auburn.edu
Abstract: Public policy and strategy do not keep up to date with technology. There is generally a lag time
between the release and application of a technology till a shortcoming is observed. Once a shortcoming is
revealed it is a race to address that potential weakness with improved policy, updated strategy, a technological
initiative to combat the shortcoming, or a necessary combination of all methods. The invent of computer reliant
and networked systems has created a modern arms race which has seen more innovation and more need for
updated policy and strategy than any other period in history, yet the United States continues to fall behind in this
arms race. When security cannot be verified, but only risk mitigated, it is time to think deterrence. Unfortunately,
deterrence falls apart when you cannot identify the perpetrator behind attacks. This paper will look at the role that
information has played in previous conflicts, as well as the modern strategy towards protecting the United States
in cyberspace, and will draw a singular conclusion as to the best course of action towards improving our security.
Through a mix of policy, strategy, and technology the anonymity which attackers use as a shield needs to be
eliminated in order to allow room for a strong policy of deterrence with a verifiable response. In establishing the
means to identify our attackers and provide serious recourse cybersecurity can be greatly improved for the
United States.
Keywords: information warfare, security, policy, strategy, history, information security
1. The motivation
“We’re already at war in cyberspace; have been for many years.”
Gen Ronald E. Keys, Commander, Air Combat Command
On 6 September 2007 Fulghum reported that Israeli aircraft flew into Syria from Turkey and destroyed
a construction site (2007). The site was thought to have contained equipment for the refinement of
weapons grade nuclear material provided by North Korea.
The interesting part of this story for the purposes of this paper is that Syria, a country with an
advanced anti-air defense system purchased from Russia, did not even see the 10 F-15Is appear on
their radar. These are not stealthy aircraft, and with weapons hanging off the wings, should have been
easily spotted on radar. Further, troops were massing at Israel’s borders signaling a possible attack.
Syria was expecting something. So what happened?
The thought is that the Israeli’s were able to somehow disable the radar sites and to provide a window
where the jets could get in, bomb the target, and leave without threat. Was it a trap door in the radar
software? Did the Israeli’s use a special UAV to signal blank radar screen to the radar sites? They
haven’t said yet, and the only clear part is that Israel ‘owned’ those sites for a single night and proved
the strength of cyber warfare.
Unfortunately, if the U.S. were in this tale we would be more like Syria than Israel.
2. Open source
Due to publication constraints, and the desire to stay at the unclassified level, this paper will deal only
with open resources.
3. The (not so) recent history of information operations
“It is pointless to deal with enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or
technology.”
Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired
Net-centric warfare has become a much bandied about buzzword in the modern military vernacular. A
simple definition of net-centric warfare from the Office of Force Transformation (2005) is:
“the translation of an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology,
into a competitive war fighting advantage through the use of well-informed geographically
dispersed forces.
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