Systematic Theology, by Louis Berkhof - New Leaven

c. It is, finally, an immediate concurrence. In His government of the world God employs
all kinds of means for the realization of His ends; but He does not so work in the divine
concurrence. When He destroys the cities of the plain by fire, this is an act of divine
government in which He employs means. But at the same time it is His immediate
concurrence by which He enables the fire to fall, to burn, and to destroy. So God also
works in man in endowing him with power, in the determination of his actions, and in
sustaining his activities all along the line.
4. THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE AND SIN. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Arminians raise
a serious objection to this doctrine of providence. They maintain that a previous
concurrence, which is not merely general but predetermines man to specific actions, makes
God the responsible author of sin. Reformed theologians are well aware of the difficulty
that presents itself here, but do not feel free to circumvent it by denying God’s absolute
control over the free actions of His moral creatures, since this is clearly taught in
Scripture, Gen. 45:5; 50:19,20; Ex. 10:1,20; II Sam. 16:10.11; Isa. 10:5-7; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28.
They feel constrained to teach: (a) that sinful acts are under divine control and occur
according to God’s pre-determination and purpose, but only by divine permission, so
that He does not efficiently cause men to sin, Gen. 45:5; 50:20; Ex. 14:17; Isa. 66:4; Rom.
9:22; II Thess. 2:11; (b) that God often restrains the sinful works of the sinner, Gen. 3:6;
Job 1:12; 2:6; Ps. 76:10; Isa. 10:15; Acts 7:51; and (c) that God in behalf of His own
purpose overrules evil for good, Gen. 50:20; Ps. 76:10; Acts. 3:13.
This does not mean, however, that they all agree in answering the question. whether
there is a direct, immediate and physical energizing of the active power of the creature,
disposing and pre-determining it efficaciously to the specific act, and also enabling it to
do that act. Dabney, for instance, while admitting such a physical concurrence in the
lower creation, denies it with respect to free agents. The great majority, however,
maintain it also in the case of free moral beings. Even Dabney agrees that God’s control
over all of the acts of His creatures is certain, sovereign, and efficacious; and therefore
must, along with the others, face the question as to the responsibility of God for sin. He
gives his conclusion in the following words: “This, then, is my picture of the
providential evolution of God’s purpose as to sinful acts; so to arrange and group
events and objects around free agents by his manifold wisdom and power, as to place
each soul, at every step, in the presence of those circumstances, which, He knows, will
be a sufficient objective inducement to it to do, of its own native, free activity, just the
thing called for by God’s plan. Thus the act is man’s alone, though its occurrence is
efficaciously secured by God. And the sin is man’s only. God’s concern in it is holy, first,
because all His personal agency in arranging to secure its occurrence was holy; and
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