Systematic Theology, by Louis Berkhof - New Leaven

2. TO REFORM THE SINNER. The idea is very much in the foreground at the present
time that there is no punitive justice in God which inexorably calls for the punishment
of the sinner, and that God is not angry with the sinner but loves him, and only inflicts
hardships upon him, in order to reclaim him and to bring him back to his Father’s
home. This is an un-Scriptural view, which obliterates the distinction between
punishment and chastisement. The penalty of sin does not proceed from the love and
mercy of the Lawgiver, but from His justice. If reformation follows the infliction of
punishment, this is not due to the penalty as such, but is the fruit of some gracious
operation of God by which He turns that which is in itself an evil for the sinner into
something that is beneficial. The distinction between chastisement and punishment
must be maintained. The Bible teaches us on the one hand that God loves and chastens
His people, Job 5:17; Ps. 6:1; Ps. 94:12; 118:18; Prov. 3:11; Isa. 26:16; Heb. 12:5-8; Rev. 3:19;
and on the other hand, that He hates and punishes evil-doers, Ps. 5:5; 7:11; Nah. 1:2;
Rom. 1:18; 2:5,6; 11 Thess. 1:6; Heb. 10:26,27. Moreover, a punishment must be
recognized as just, that is, as according to justice, in order to be reformatory. According
to this theory a sinner who has already reformed could no more be punished; nor could
one beyond the possibility of reformation, so that there could be no punishment for
Satan; the death penalty would have to be abolished, and eternal punishment would
have no reason for existence.
3. TO DETER MEN FROM SIN. Another theory rather prevalent in our day is that the
sinner must be punished for the protection of society, by deterring others from the
commission of similar offenses. There can be no doubt about it that this end is often
secured in the family, in the state, and in the moral government of the world, but this is
an incidental result which God graciously effects by the infliction of the penalty. It
certainly cannot be the ground for the infliction of the penalty. There is no justice
whatever in punishing an individual simply for the good of society. As a matter of fact
the sinner is always punished for his sin, and incidentally this may be for the good of
society. And here again it may be said that no punishment will have a deterring effect, if
it is not just and right in itself. Punishment has a good effect only when it is evident that
the person on whom it is afflicted really deserves punishment. If this theory were true, a
criminal might at once be set free, if it were not for the possibility that others might be
deterred from sin by his punishment. Moreover, a man might rightly commit a crime, if
he were only willing to bear the penalty. According to this view punishment is in no
sense grounded in the past, but is wholly prospective. But on that supposition it is very
hard to explain how it invariably causes the repentant sinner to look back and to confess
with contrite heart the sins of the past, as we notice in such passages as the following:
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