Systematic Theology, by Louis Berkhof - New Leaven

indifference, but rational self-determination. God has reasons for willing as He does,
which induce Him to choose one end rather than another, and one set of means to
accomplish one end in preference to others. There is in each case a prevailing motive,
which makes the end chosen and the means selected the most pleasing to Him, though
we may not be able to determine what this motive is. In general it may be said that God
cannot will anything that is contrary to His nature, to His wisdom or love, to His
righteousness or holiness. Dr. Bavinck points out that we can seldom discern why God
willed one thing rather than another, and that it is not possible nor even permissible for
us to look for some deeper ground of things than the will of God, because all such
attempts result in seeking a ground for the creature in the very Being of God, in robbing
it of its contingent character, and in making it necessary, eternal, divine. 32
d. God’s will in relation to sin. The doctrine of the will of God often gives rise to
serious questions. Problems arise here which have never yet been solved and which are
probably incapable of solution by man.
(1) It is said that if the decretive will of God also determined the entrance of sin into
the world, God thereby becomes the author of sin and really wills something that is
contrary to His moral perfections. Arminians, to escape the difficulty, make the will of
God to permit sin dependent on His foreknowledge of the course which man would
choose. Reformed theologians, while maintaining on the basis of such passages as Acts
2:23; 3:8; etc., that God’s decretive will also includes the sinful deeds of man, are always
careful to point out that this must be conceived in such a way that God does not become
the author of sin. They frankly admit that they cannot solve the difficulty, but at the
same time make some valuable distinctions that prove helpful. Most of them insist on it
that God’s will with respect to sin is simply a will to permit sin and not a will to
effectuate it, as He does the moral good. This terminology is certainly permissible,
provided it is understood correctly. It should be borne in mind that God’s will to permit
sin carries certainty with it. Others call attention to the fact that, while the terms “will”
or “to will” may include the idea of complacency or delight, they sometimes point to a
simple determination of the will; and that therefore the will of God to permit sin need
not imply that He takes delight or pleasure in sin.
(2) Again, it is said that the decretive and preceptive will of God are often
contradictory. His decretive will includes many things which He forbids in His
preceptive will, and excludes many things which He commands in His preceptive will,
cf. Gen. 22; Ex. 4:21-23; II Kings 20:1-7; Acts 2:23. Yet it is of great importance to
32 Geref. Dogm. II, p. 241.
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