Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

REGULATION SCHOOL THEORY
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trace of technological determinism. Those such as Hirschhorn (1984) who place
emphasis on the cybernetic capabilities of computers fall too easily into a tradition
which presumes that advanced technologies bring with them advanced skill
requirements. From his perspective ‘industrial technology’ is ‘transcultural’,
unavoidably ‘shap[ing] social life in the same mould everywhere’ (p. 15), only
to be broken (and liberated) by ‘postindustrial technology’ [sic] which brings
flexibility.
Second, ‘flexible specialisation’ is presented as the opposite of mass production
and with this in some way contrary to the continuing dominance of large
corporate organisations. However, it is doubtful whether this is the case, for
several reasons. One, which has already been reviewed, is that it underestimates
the flexibilities of giant corporations that are well able to introduce into their
affairs new modes of working, new technologies that enhance versatility, and
modular products that allow for significant product differentiation while continuing
mass-production practices. As Michael Sabel (1982) concedes, ‘existing
Fordist firms may be able to meet the changing demand without sacrificing their
fundamental operating principles’ (p. 194). Case studies of large motor manufacturers
indicate this possibility; Nissan, for example, established a new and flexible
production plant in Sunderland, but continued relations which entailed close
control over a subordinated labour force (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992). Again, a
study of Nike (Vanderbilt, 1998) concludes that production remains thoroughly
Fordist, with the added benefit for the company that 70 per cent of its trainers
are manufactured in China and Indonesia, with organisation and marketing – the
critical information work and ‘value added’ in terms of what can be charged for
the shoes – located in the United States. Perhaps, as Keith Grint (1991) observes,
it is unwise to conceptualise changes in terms of such decisive differences as flexible
versus mass production imply. More likely, ‘[w]hat we have . . . is not the
replacement of one form of production by another but the development of parallel
and juxtaposed systems operating for different kinds of markets’ (p. 298).
A third objection is that, in spite of undoubted examples of flexible specialisation
that may be found, mass production remains dominant throughout the
advanced economies. Thus any suggestion of a marked change is empirically
false. Still another insists that there is little new about flexibility since it has been
a feature of capitalist enterprise since its origination (Pollert, 1988, pp. 45–6). The
nineteenth century is replete with instances of specialist enterprises to meet
market segments, but no one has ever felt compelled to present, say, the rag
trade or toy makers (cf. Mayhew, 1971) as illustrative of flexible specialisation.
Connectedly, while enthusiasts present flexible specialisation in positive
terms, it can be interpreted as the re-emergence of what others have termed
‘segmented labour’. That is, while there may indeed be a core of confident, skilled
and versatile employees, there are also identifiable much more vulnerable (and
hence flexible) ‘peripheral’ people working part-time, casually or on short-term
contracts (Gordon et al., 1982). Arguably these ‘peripheral’ groups have expanded
in recent years, though there is some doubt about quite how much this has
happened and certainly they have long been a feature of capitalist enterprise.
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