Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
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REGULATION SCHOOL THEORY<br />
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workers) is disappearing, it is as well to remember that <strong>the</strong> industrial working<br />
class has always been in a minority in all countries except Britain (and even<br />
<strong>the</strong>re it only just constituted a majority for a short period), and that manual<br />
work for much <strong>of</strong> modern history has been undertaken very largely by agricultural<br />
labourers. In Britain, for instance, farm workers accounted for 25 per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> occupied population in <strong>the</strong> mid-nineteenth century, more than<br />
<strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> those engaged in mining, transport, building and engineering<br />
(Hobsbawm, 1968, pp. 283, 279). Agriculture’s continual decline since <strong>the</strong>n (it<br />
is now less than 3 per cent <strong>of</strong> total employment) highlights <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong><br />
working class (i.e. manual workers) has a long history <strong>of</strong> recomposition<br />
(Miliband, 1985) with certain occupations growing and o<strong>the</strong>rs in decline.<br />
This being so, we might <strong>the</strong>n also be sceptical <strong>of</strong> those commentators who<br />
conclude that a steady growth <strong>of</strong> white-collar work announces <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
working class. This very much depends upon one’s definitional criteria. Thus<br />
<strong>the</strong> expanding army <strong>of</strong> non-manual employees certainly does have particular<br />
characteristics, but it may be premature to assume that <strong>the</strong>y are more decisively<br />
differentiated from <strong>the</strong> factory worker today than was <strong>the</strong> engineering<br />
tradesman from <strong>the</strong> agricultural labourer at <strong>the</strong> turn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> century. Moreover,<br />
recollecting <strong>the</strong>se sorts <strong>of</strong> division within manual occupations, we might<br />
usefully reflect on <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re has never been a period <strong>of</strong> working-class<br />
homogeneity as suggested by <strong>the</strong> Fordist typology. After all, to take just voting<br />
preferences, we may be reminded that <strong>the</strong> 1950s in Britain were a period <strong>of</strong><br />
continuous Conservative ascendancy despite <strong>the</strong> fact that manual workers<br />
contributed <strong>the</strong> overwhelming majority <strong>of</strong> voters.<br />
In sum, it is as well to hold in mind that <strong>the</strong> equation <strong>of</strong> manual work with<br />
<strong>the</strong> working class, and this with a homogeneity <strong>of</strong> outlook, is very much a<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> intellectuals. It may imply a confluence that in reality is absent,<br />
just as it may suggest an unbridgeable gulf separating <strong>the</strong> working class from<br />
white-collar (and <strong>the</strong>reby middle-class?) work. Finally, while we ponder <strong>the</strong>se<br />
problems, we might also remember that manual work has far from disappeared<br />
in <strong>the</strong> ‘post-Fordist’ era – in Britain today it still amounts to about half <strong>the</strong><br />
total workforce.<br />
• Post-Fordism makes a good deal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decline <strong>of</strong> work in factories and <strong>the</strong><br />
shift to service occupations such as in finance and leisure. This is undeniably<br />
empirically true, but, as we saw in Chapter 3, it is hard to contend that this<br />
marks a really pr<strong>of</strong>ound change. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong> spread <strong>of</strong> many services<br />
is to be explained by divisions <strong>of</strong> labour introduced to make more effective<br />
capitalist activity.<br />
• The post-Fordist emphasis on consumption, to which I return, has met with<br />
many objections. Prominent among <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong> following:<br />
(i) Consumption has been a concern since at least <strong>the</strong> latter part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
eighteenth century when industrial techniques began to make consumer<br />
goods available on a wide scale (McKendrick et al., 1982). Seen from a longterm<br />
perspective, recent developments may indicate an acceleration <strong>of</strong><br />
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