Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
Giddens feels that the classical sociologist Max Weber’s conception of formal
rationality which underpins purposive (goal-directed) action (most famously
manifested in the growth of bureaucratic structures) might apply on one definition.
After all, it involves abstract and codifiable principles, rules and regulations
(the entire bureaucratic machine), as well as requiring from participants command
of abstract knowledge (how the system works). Theoretical knowledge, in
these terms, is not much more than learning the rules and procedures of how
bureaucracies function. If so, then one is forced also to ask what is especially
new about this. This being so, PIS’s emphasis on knowledge is essentially an
extension and acceleration of industrialism’s priorities, and we are back to
rehearsing doubts about the novelty of PIS.
This leads us to the wider complaint about the imprecision of the term ‘theoretical
knowledge’. If, for instance, the ‘primacy of theoretical knowledge’ is taken
to refer to known scientific principles (the boiling point of water, the conductivity
of elements, etc.) which are codified in texts, then this is one matter. However,
if theoretical knowledge is taken to include hypothetical models such as the relation
between inflation and unemployment, poverty and life chances, or social
class and educational opportunity, then this surely is another. It may be that such
theoretical knowledge is distinguishable from laws of physics only by degree, but
this remains an important difference nonetheless. If theoretical knowledge is
perceived as the prominence in modern life of the expert systems that operate
services such as water and sewage systems, air traffic control and the telephone
networks, on the basis of systematic monitoring of activities which are ongoingly
(re)organised on the basis of established principles (of toxicity, safety of margins
and so forth), then this, too, is another thing. Alternatively, if theoretical knowledge
is to be understood as a trend towards very much more intensified
reflexivity among individuals as well as institutions, on the basis of which they
then shape their future courses of action, then this is another thing again. Finally,
if the rise of theoretical knowledge is to be chartered by the spread of educational
certification – a common strategy – then this is to introduce still another
significantly different definition. Such imprecisions lead one to be suspicious of
theoretical knowledge as a criterion for distinguishing an information society,
albeit that a shift towards the primacy of theory does appear to be a marked
feature of recent history.
Conclusion
Daniel Bell began some years ago to substitute the concept ‘information society’
for ‘post-industrialism’. But in doing so he did not significantly change his terms
of analysis: to all intents and purposes, his ‘information society’ is the same as
his ‘post-industrialism’. However, we have seen in this chapter that his analysis
cannot be sustained.
Undeniably, information and knowledge – and all the technological systems
that accompany the ‘information explosion’ – have quantitatively expanded. It
can also be readily admitted that these have become central to the day-to-day
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