Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

INFORMATION, REFLEXIVITY AND SURVEILLANCE
being profoundly influenced by industry’s capacity to produce equipment essential
for its conduct, what has been called the ‘industrialisation of war’ was a
central feature of the twentieth century. Indeed, it is possible to depict the period
from around 1914 through to the 1970s as one of industrial warfare in which mass
mobilisation and a close association between industrial production and military
capability were defining characteristics (Kennedy, 1988).
From industrial to information war
However, over the past generation we have seen the unravelling of industrial
warfare, to be replaced, in an incremental but accelerating manner, by what one
might term information war that places an even greater emphasis on the informational
dimensions of war than its predecessor. Information in warfare nowadays
has a massively heightened and more pervasive role than hitherto, whether
it involves the observation of one’s enemy (or potential enemies), arranging the
deployment of one’s resources, or the management of public opinion at home
and abroad. Furthermore, information has permeated all dimensions of modern
warfare, whether in the form of satellites that may surveille the enemy, in
computers that record and assess military requirements wherever they may be,
or in ‘smart’ weapons which are pre-programmed to ‘fire and forget’. That is,
information is no longer simply a matter of intelligence about an enemy or about
one’s resources; it is now, and as a matter of routine, incorporated into the
weaponry and decision-making systems themselves.
We may signal some of the distinguishing features of information war
(Libicki, 1995):
• With the dispersal of the military around the globe (chiefly with United States
and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] forces), there have developed
exceptionally complex and durable systems of command and control to coordinate,
assess and oversee these resources. The computer communications
infrastructure to handle and protect information flows is a prerequisite of
contemporary war, especially evident in the important instance of command
and control of nuclear weapons (Bracken, 1983). It is at once a source of
strength and vulnerability, with command and control systems a priority target
for any combatant in war.
• Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the removal of the attendant
threat of a collision of superpowers, the expectation is that most future
conflicts will be what Manuel Castells (1996) terms ‘instant wars’ (pp. 454–61),
by which is meant relatively brief encounters (outside civil-war situations,
which are problematical for obvious reasons), with active operations lasting
only for days or a few weeks, in which the United States (or NATO and/or
United Nations [UN] approved forces) is victorious by virtue of the overwhelming
superiority of its military resources.
• This means that war will no longer require mobilisation of the population (at
least, not inside the major powers, where an important aim is to wage clean
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