Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

INFORMATION AND POSTMODERNITY
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range of spheres, the influence of performativity and commodification: in
publishing, where ‘how to’ and ‘blockbusters’ predominate; in television, where
the ‘ratings’ are the critical measure of success since these bring in advertising
revenue; in research and development activity where ‘marketable solutions’ are
sought by investors, where scientists are compelled to sign copyright waivers,
and where ‘intellectual property’ is protected in patent submissions. Above
all, perhaps, Lyotard refocuses attention on the educational sphere, surely a
quintessential, but often downplayed, element of the ‘information society’, to
demonstrate the intrusion of performativity criteria and the increased commercialisation
of affairs (Robins and Webster, 1989; 2002).
The main problem with Lyotard, however, is that he concludes from all of
this that the reliability of all knowledge is lost and that an appropriate response
is to celebrate our release from the ‘tyranny’ of truth. This gay abandon appears
oblivious to the power and interests that have guided and continue to direct the
spread of performativity and commodification. Moreover, were one to identify the
processes and agencies of power and interest, this would be to describe a reality
that implies the possibility at least of alternative ways of arranging matters: ‘This
is as it is and why it is so – we can make it different.’ In short, it would be to
uphold the Enlightenment ideal of pursuing an alternative, and better, way of life.
A postmodern condition?
Postmodern thought has undeniably influenced a broad range of reflection on
contemporary life, not least amongst analysts of informational matters. It has
permeated a good deal of Sociology, Cultural Studies and Communications scholarship
where such as Lyotard and Baudrillard – and most eminently Foucault –
are frequently referenced. It will be clear that I acknowledge this contribution
and influence, though I am also deeply unsympathetic to postmodern thought.
Too often it seems smart-alec and irresponsible, manifesting a radical delight in
mischievously questioning anything and everything while being incapable of
discriminating between the pertinence of questions and qualities of evidence.
Thereby postmodernism reveals a profound conservatism, being all talk with no
consequence (other than to leave things alone), something akin to the court jester
during the medieval period. This is why Jürgen Habermas (1981) was correct,
years ago, to identify postmodernism as neo-conservative, in spite of the radical
chic appeal of Foucault and his acolytes. In addition, postmodernism’s relativism,
where difference is everything and all interpretations are interpretations of interpretations,
is inconsistent, self-denying and fundamentally irresponsible. It can be
amusing, even revealing, when musing on the complexities of small-scale interaction,
but when relativism is applied to matters such as war, militant religious
cults and the massacre of almost two hundred schoolchildren in Beslan in
September 2004 by ruthless terrorists its intellectual and political bankruptcy
is evident.
My lack of sympathy with postmodern thought ought not to be taken as denial
that there is something that one might reasonably describe as a postmodern
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