Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
1
rehearsed shortcomings of social science (such as, as we shall see, technological
determinism and technocratic assumptions). He is quick to repudiate such accusations,
though denial alone does not ensure innocence. 2 Certainly my view is
that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that PIS is a superior form of society
to anything that has gone before, just as it is hard to resist the idea that we
are moving ineluctably towards ‘post-industrialism’ owing to underlying social
trends. When I review Bell’s description of PIS, readers will be able to gauge this
commitment to evolutionist premises for themselves.
Separate realms
1
1
2
1
1
But first an important theoretical and methodological point that is fundamental
to Daniel Bell’s oeuvre: PIS emerges through changes in social structure rather
than in politics or culture. Its development most certainly ‘poses questions’ (Bell,
1973, p. 13) for the polity and cultural domain, but Bell is emphatic that change
cannot be seen to be emanating from any one sector to influence every other
dimension of society. In his view advanced societies are ‘radically disjunctive’
(Bell, 1980, p. 329). That is, there are independent ‘realms’ – social structure,
polity and culture – which have an autonomy one from another such that an
occurrence in one realm cannot be presumed to shape another. For instance, if
something were to change in the economy, it may certainly present politicians
with opportunities or difficulties, but Bell is insistent that it does not automatically
call forth a retort: the realm of social structure (which includes the economy)
is one thing, the polity quite another.
Put in other terms, Bell is an anti-holist, iterating over and again that societies
are not ‘organic or so integrated as to be analysable as a single system’ (Bell, 1973,
p. 114). He determinedly rejects all totalistic/holistic theories of society, whether
(and especially if) they come from the Left and conceive of capitalism as something
which intrudes into each and every aspect of society, or whether they are
more conservative and believe society functions in an integrative manner, tending
towards order and equilibrium. Against these approaches Bell divides, apparently
arbitrarily (why just three realms? why not an independent realm for law, family
or education?), contemporary societies into the three realms of social structure,
politics and culture. As I have said, Professor Bell does not offer an argument
for there being ‘disjunctive realms’ in the modern world: there just are separate
spheres, and the social scientist who fails to acknowledge the fact is in error.
Why bother with Bell’s insistence that societies are divided into separable
realms? The reason is that, as we shall see, it is pivotal for several aspects
of Bell’s thought. First, it enables him to hold apparently contradictory views
simultaneously. Bell’s much-repeated claim that ‘I am a conservative in culture;
socialist in economics; liberal in politics’ (Bell, 1976, p. xi) hinges on his conviction
that there are three autonomous spheres towards which he can have different
views. So long as he can hold that culture is separate from economics, economics
from politics and so on, then Bell can appear to be credible in all three roles –
rather than a confused and contradictory thinker who lacks consistency.
37