Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

REGULATION SCHOOL THEORY
to argue that ‘[i]f there is one supreme casualty in British public life . . . it is the
ethos of planning’ (p. 509), an ideology seemingly out of touch with the rapidity
of change and laissez-faire operation of these ‘new times’.
Nowadays it can seem that even the language of class has lost its salience.
Long the core concept of social scientists (‘Tell me your class and I’ll tell you
your politics, work, educational expectations . . . and even your sexual habits’),
today there is markedly less interest in class contours, conflicts and inequalities.
It all seems dated, too resonant of the 1960s, of Alan Sillitoe novels, the
dreary industrial north – rather old-fashioned and out of time. The best sociologists
continue to demonstrate that class still matters, but even they struggle
to identify ways in which the language of just a generation ago fails to capture
the variabilities and values of the unequal society that is Britain today (Savage
et al., 2005).
To be sure, there is in some intellectual circles interest in an underclass,
thought to inhabit the inner-city ghettoes and isolated parts of the regions, but
significantly it is considered a tiny group detached from the vast majority of
society, separate and self-perpetuating, which, if an irritant to law-abiding
travellers, is apart from the bulk of the populace which is mortgage-owning, selfand
career-centred. Interestingly enough, some of the more compelling recent
accounts of class in Britain come from deeply conservative thinkers eager to insist
that class does still matter, though their analyses focus almost exclusively on
those on the periphery of the system who are outcast, alien, without a stake
in post-industrial society and to be pitied, feared and condemned altogether
(Dalrymple, 2005; Mount, 2004).
It is commonplace now to insist that the majority of the population is to be
understood in terms of different lifestyles. In the post-Fordist regime class categorisations,
and with them an associated common culture (the working-class
male: work, community, club, mates, pigeons, football, horses, beer), have given
way to consideration of differentiated ways of life, to choices, options and – as
noted above – customisation of production. Uniformity and sameness are out,
replaced by variety both within the individual and within social groups.
Some commentators insist that this results in the fragmentation of people’s
identities, in a loss of stability and satisfactions, while to others it is a democratising
force which opens up new experiences and opportunities, stimulates the
‘decentred’ self and generates excitement. However, whatever differences of
viewpoint here, the condition of post-Fordism is agreed upon: there is a new individualism
around, an acknowledgement of variable lifestyles, and a recognition
that class – which stands accused of being but a construction of the sociologist
which is imposed on subjects of study – has lost force as a predictor of other
dimensions of attitude and behaviour and as a basis of mobilising people on the
political or industrial front.
We can appreciate here yet again how information and information circulation
play an especially pertinent role in the post-Fordist regime. As Fordism is
transformed from a production- to a consumption-orientated system, not only
is there a decline of the mass industrial worker, but also there emerges a more
individualist and consumption-centred person. Information necessarily takes on
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