Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
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individual’ (p. 128) as the central reference point. Concerns like the environment,
care of the elderly, the achievements of education which must be more than
vocational, all take precedence over mere matters of economic output and competitiveness
– and, thanks to the professionals’ expertise and priorities, can be
addressed. They represent a shift, attests Bell, from an ‘economising’ (maximisation
of return for self-interest) ethos towards a ‘sociologising’ mode of life (‘the
effort to judge a society’s needs in more conscious fashion . . . on the basis of
some explicit conception of the “public interest”’ (Bell, 1973, p. 283).
Readers may at this point be reminded of the request to reflect on the charge
that the theory of ‘post-industrial’ society contains evolutionary assumptions. It
is, I think, hard to avoid the conclusion that PIS is a superior form of society, one
at a higher stage of development than its predecessors, and one towards which
all societies capable of increasing productivity are moving.
Intellectual conservatism
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What is abundantly clear in all of this is that increases in information work and
a greater availability of professional occupations operating on knowledge-based
credentials lead Daniel Bell to identify a distinctive break between industrial and
post-industrial societies. While it is incontestable that there is more information
employment than hitherto, and that there is an obvious increase in information
in use, there are major problems with Bell’s argument that post-industrialism
marks a system break with previous societies.
One difficulty is with the rather shaky foundations on which Bell constructs
his theory of a new type of society. There is no inherent reason why increases
in professionals, even striking ones, should lead one to conclude that a new
age is upon us. For instance, it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that if, say,
the pattern of industrial ownership remained the same and the dynamic which
drove the economy stayed constant, then the system – occupations apart – would
remain intact. No one has suggested, for example, that a country such as
Switzerland, because it is heavily reliant on banking and finance, is a fundamentally
different society from, say, Norway or Spain where occupations are
differently spread. All are recognisably capitalist, whatever surface features they
may exhibit.
To be sure, Bell and his sympathisers have two responses to this. The first
revolves around the question: what degree of change does one need to conclude
there has been a systemic break? The only honest answer to this is that it is a
matter of judgement and reasoned argument – and I shall produce reasons to
support my judgement of systemic continuity in a moment. Second, it must be
conceded that Bell, with his commitment to separate ‘realm’ analysis, could reply
that changes along one axis represent a new social order even while on other,
unconnected dimensions there are continuities. Ipso facto his commitment to
there being an identifiable ‘post-industrial’ society evidenced by occupational and
informational developments could be sustained. I shall reply to these defences
below in the section immediately following by arguing that his anti-holism is
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