Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

INFORMATION AND POSTMODERNITY
been believed that signs were representational (in that they pointed to some reality
beyond them), today everybody knows that signs are simulations and nothing
more (Baudrillard, 1983a). For example, one may imagine that advertisements
might represent the qualities of particular objects in a true way. That they
manifestly do not is a frequent cause of irritation to modernist critics who claim
to reveal the distortions of advertisements which suggest, say, that a certain
hair shampoo brings with it sexual allure or that a particular alcoholic drink
induces sociability. The modernist who exposes the tricks of advertisers (false
associations, depth psychology and so on) works on two assumptions: first, that
he or she is privileged to recognise the deceptions of advertisers, something to
which most consumers are blind, and, second, that an authentic form of advertising
in which the advertisement genuinely represents the product is capable of
being made.
Baudrillard’s retort is that ordinary people are quite as knowledgeable as
modernist intellectuals such as Vance Packard and Kenneth Galbraith, but they
just do not bother to make a fuss about it. Of course they realise that advertisements
are . . . well, advertisements. They are not the ‘real thing’, just make-believe,
just simulations. Everybody, and not just intellectuals, knows that Coca-Cola does
not ‘teach the world to sing’, that Levi’s jeans won’t transform middle-aged men
into 20-year-old hunks, or that Wrigley’s chewing gum will not lead to thrilling
sexual encounters. As such, we ought not to get concerned about advertising
since the ‘silent majorities’ (Baudrillard, 1983a) are not much bothered by it.
That said, Baudrillard does assert that people enjoy advertisements, not for
any messages the advertiser might try to convey, and certainly not because they
might be persuaded to go out to buy something after watching them, but simply
because advertisements can bring pleasure. Advertising ‘acts as spectacle and
fascination’ (Baudrillard, 1983a, p. 35) – just that. Who knows, who cares, what
Ford, Guinness or Benson & Hedges advertisements signify? We may – or we
may not – just enjoy the experience of looking at the signs. 1
Similarly, consider the modernist anxiety Professor Habermas manifests
when he expresses concern about the packaging of politics in contemporary
democracies. To critics such as Habermas the manipulation of political information
is deplorable, with its meticulous preparations by the politicians and their
PR advisers for media interviews reprehensible (rehearsals, briefings, staged
events, off-the-record discussions, make-up and clothing chosen to project a
desirable image, media consultants playing a disproportionate role in presenting
policies and their ministers). The appeal of the critics here, explicit or not, is that
politicians ought to be honest and open, truthful and direct, instead of hiding
behind misleading and mendacious media ‘images’.
Baudrillard’s response to this modernist complaint would take two forms. On
the one hand, he would insist that the dream of signs that represent politics and
politicians in an accurate way is a fantasy. Unavoidably the media will be able
to show only certain issues, particular personalities, and a limited range of political
parties. For no other reason, the limitations of time mean that political
coverage is restricted to certain issues and political positions. Add to that the
disposition of politicians to pressure to have the most favourable arguments for
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