Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome

INFORMATION, REFLEXIVITY AND SURVEILLANCE
reach to the level of identifying the individuals from whom the original data were
gleaned.
In spite of this, the information so gathered is frequently essential for the functioning
of modern organisations (political parties, retail companies, family planners,
etc.) and, moreover, it very often feeds back to other individuals (through
media and educational institutions especially) who, having learned more about
people and expectations, are themselves better-equipped to make choices about
the conduct of their own lives (e.g. about the range of lifestyles available in society
at any given time, about different sexual preferences, about the variety of childrearing
practices). Again we encounter the paradox: as more is known about
people, so individuals may get opportunities to enhance their own individuality
by making ‘choices’ of their own.
In what follows it is as well to bear in mind these observations because, when
it comes to examining the growth of surveillance, it is easy to adopt a Manichean
position (Lyon, 2001). In this sense more observation appears, inescapably, to
intrude upon the liberties of individuals, just as greater organisation appears,
necessarily, to diminish the individual’s autonomy. In such circumstances the
ready-available judgement – how awful! – may be an oversimplification. When it
comes to analysis of the state’s role in organisation and observation – something
with which this chapter is centrally concerned – such a judgement is especially
appealing, which is yet further reason to beware impulsive judgements.
The nation state, violence and surveillance
In helping us to understand the expansion of surveillance and organisation in
modern times, perhaps most important is the special attention Giddens pays to
the role of the state. I want to elaborate on this contribution, but would preface
my remarks with a point Giddens has made many times. This is that, in most
circumstances, when we talk of ‘society’ we are actually referring to nation states.
Thus when we study ‘modern society’ as a rule we study ‘modern Britain’ (if we
are British), and when we compare different ‘societies’ we generally contrast
nation states (for instance Britain and the United States). While this equation of
‘society’ and ‘nation state’ is satisfactory for much of the time, it has to be recognised
that the two terms are not synonymous. The nation state is a particular
kind of society, one created very recently in world history.
The concept of a nation state came into being during the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and, while it has been at the centre of the construction
of the world as we know it (Gellner, 1983), it should be examined as an artifice.
The nation state is not ‘society’, but a particular type of society that has distinctive
characteristics. Here we may telegraph a central theme of Giddens’s argument.
He contends that from the outset in the nation state, conceived as a bounded area
– territory – over which is exercised political power, information has a special
significance. Indeed, from their beginning, nation states are ‘information societies’
in that they must, minimally, know their own members (and, necessarily, those
who do not belong). Giddens believes that nation states must maintain hold of
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