Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
Theories of the Information Society, Third Edition - Cryptome
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INFORMATION AND DEMOCRACY<br />
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The upshot <strong>of</strong> such developments was <strong>the</strong> formation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘bourgeois public<br />
sphere’ by <strong>the</strong> mid-nineteenth century with its characteristic features <strong>of</strong> open<br />
debate, critical scrutiny, full reportage, increased accessibility and independence<br />
<strong>of</strong> actors from economic interest as well as from state control. Habermas emphasises<br />
that <strong>the</strong> fight for independence from <strong>the</strong> state was an essential constituent<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘bourgeois public sphere’. That is, early capitalism was impelled to resist<br />
<strong>the</strong> established state – hence <strong>the</strong> centrality <strong>of</strong> struggles for a free press, for<br />
political reform and for greater representation.<br />
However, as <strong>the</strong> historical analysis proceeds, Habermas points to paradoxical<br />
features <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘bourgeois public sphere’ that led ultimately to what he calls<br />
its ‘refeudalisation’ in some areas. The first centres on <strong>the</strong> continuing aggrandisement<br />
<strong>of</strong> capitalism. While Habermas notes that <strong>the</strong>re had long been a ‘mutual<br />
infiltration’ (p. 141) <strong>of</strong> private property and <strong>the</strong> public sphere, his view is that a<br />
precarious balance was tilted towards <strong>the</strong> former during <strong>the</strong> closing decades <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> nineteenth century. As capitalism grew in strength and influence, so did its<br />
enthusiasts move from calls for reform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> established state towards a takeover<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state and use <strong>of</strong> it to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir own ends. In short, <strong>the</strong> capitalist state<br />
came into being: as such its adherents increasingly turned <strong>the</strong>ir backs on an agitational<br />
and argumentative role and used <strong>the</strong> state – now dominated by capital –<br />
to fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir own ends. The result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong> MPs’ private directorships,<br />
<strong>of</strong> business financing <strong>of</strong> political parties and think tanks, and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
systematic lobbying <strong>of</strong> Parliament and public opinion by organised interests<br />
has been a reduction in <strong>the</strong> autonomy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sphere. To be sure, <strong>the</strong>re<br />
have been alternative players in this game – one thinks, for instance, <strong>of</strong> organisations<br />
such as Friends <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Earth and <strong>the</strong> trade unions and, most prominently,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Labour Party in Britain – but most have spoken <strong>the</strong> ‘language <strong>of</strong> adaptation’<br />
(Miliband, 1969, p. 195) to capitalist relations and have <strong>the</strong>reby forfeited much<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir oppositional role.<br />
Habermas does not suggest that <strong>the</strong>se trends represent a straightforward<br />
return to a previous epoch. His view is that, during <strong>the</strong> twentieth century especially,<br />
<strong>the</strong> spread <strong>of</strong> a public relations and lobbying culture is actually testament<br />
to <strong>the</strong> continuing salience <strong>of</strong> important elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sphere, not least<br />
that it is acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> an area where political debate must be conducted<br />
to gain legitimacy. However, what public relations does, in entering public debate,<br />
is to disguise <strong>the</strong> interests it represents (cloaking <strong>the</strong>m in appeals such as ‘public<br />
welfare’ and <strong>the</strong> ‘national interest’), thus making contemporary debate a ‘faked<br />
version’ (Habermas, 1962, p. 195) <strong>of</strong> a genuine public sphere. It is in this sense<br />
that Habermas adopts <strong>the</strong> term ‘refeudalisation’, signalling ways in which public<br />
affairs become occasions for ‘displays’ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> powers that be (in a manner analogous<br />
to <strong>the</strong> medieval court) ra<strong>the</strong>r than spheres <strong>of</strong> contestation between<br />
different policies and outlooks.<br />
A second, related expression <strong>of</strong> ‘refeudalisation’ comes from changes within<br />
<strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> mass communications. One needs to recollect that this is central<br />
to <strong>the</strong> effective operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sphere since media allow scrutiny <strong>of</strong>, and<br />
<strong>the</strong>nce widespread access to, public affairs. However, during <strong>the</strong> twentieth<br />
century <strong>the</strong> mass media developed into monopoly capitalist organisations and,<br />
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