Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA

CHAPTER NINE
Recommendations
The First Step: Recognizing A Fundamental Problem
It is far too early in the research process to determine if any one organizational
model for the Intelligence Community is more or less effective than any
other, but I believe there is a fundamental structural question that needs to be
addressed at the outset. This is, in my view, that current reporting competes
for time and resources with indications and warning (I&W) intelligence. This
emphasis is unlikely to change, for several reasons. First, current intelligence
reporting results in significant “face-time” for the Intelligence Community
with policy makers, who, in turn, provide the resources that fund and support
community activities. This is a significant contributor to the social capital that
the Intelligence Community commands.
The second reason is that in-depth research of the kind that contributes to
I&W intelligence is a long-term investment whose payoff is often an abstraction.
Not infrequently, successful warnings are taken for granted. Those that
fail, however, may well involve the community in public recriminations that
cost the Intelligence Community significant social capital. In this sense, the
Intelligence Community’s focus on current reporting is understandable. The
problem is that producing current intelligence tends to become an all-consuming
activity. The majority of analysts who participated in this study said that
their time was spent on current reporting. Unfortunately, this does little to
improve I&W intelligence, which requires long-term research, in-depth expertise,
adoption of scientific methods, and continuous performance improvement.
The return for the Intelligence Community, in terms of social capital,
may be quite limited and even, as noted above, negative. Thus, the analytic
area most in need of long-term investment often gets the least.
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