Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA

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CHAPTER TWO instead of academic and contradictory, and that message is transmitted to the analysts. In response to the organizational norm, the analyst is inclined to work the product line rather than change it. Our products are company products, not individual products. When you publish something here, it’s the official voice. It’s important for us to speak with one voice. It doesn’t do us any good if people think we can’t make up our mind. Access matters; if people think you don’t know what you’re talking about, then they stop seeing you. We already briefed one thing. I can’t go in there and change it now. We’ll look like idiots. When I was new, I wrote a piece that disagreed with our line. Let’s just say, I’m more careful about that now. Another organizational norm that contributes to confirmation bias in the Intelligence Community is the selection and weighing of data according to classification. Secrets carry the imprimatur of the organization and, in turn, have more face validity than information collected through open sources. 16 Most analysts indicated that they considered “secret” data collected by covert means to be more important or meaningful than “open” or unclassified data. Analysts said that they rely on open sources to help fill in missing pieces of their mental models but that they test the model’s validity with secret information. Choosing to rely on classified data as more meaningful to problem solving and as a tool for testing the validity of their hypotheses serves to exacerbate the confirmation bias. I’m an all-source analyst, so I use whatever I can get my hands on; but, if the traffic comes from operations, I tend to pay more attention to it than to information in the open literature. There is something special about the word “secret” in my business. It says that it must be important because people had to go and get it rather than its just showing up in the news. We tend to weigh classified material as more important than other sources. 16 In research methodology, face validity is the concept that a measurement instrument appears or seems to measure what it is actually intended to measure and requires no theoretical supporting material. In contrast, content validity depends on the content of the domain and established theories to determine its measures of validity. See David Brinberg and Joseph McGrath, Validity and the Research Process; Edward Carmines and Richard Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment; Jerome Kirk and Marc Miller, Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research; Mark Litwin, “How to measure survey reliability and validity”; William Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base. 24
FINDINGS We get all kinds of sourced material, but I think I trust technical collection more than the other INTs. I try to use everything we get, but, if we are jammed, I rely on sources we collect. Our value-added is classified sourcing. Everybody has access to the Web and CNN. All our customers are analysts these days. What we bring to the party is information no one else has. We’re in the business of secrets. If you see that stamped on something, it must be there for a reason. The over reliance on classified information for hypothesis testing creates a situation in which the data are screened and sorted by the organization before they are selected and tested by the analysts. Classified information comes from very specific types of technical and human sources, and it is filtered through very specific reporting channels. It also has a tendency to become homogeneous because of the source types and reporting mechanisms. Because it is generated and packaged in specific formats using specific processes, classified information lacks the diversity that is inherent in open information, and this contributes to confirmation bias. In sum, operating under difficult time constraints, trying to make new work accord with previous products, trying to maintain the prestige and power of the organization, and assigning greater weight to secret information than to open information have a cumulative effect, and the analyst often finds himself or herself trying to produce daily products using the most time-efficient strategies available instead of generating or testing hypotheses by way of refutation. The persistence of the notion of tradecraft, coupled with organizational norms, promotes the use of disjointed analytic strategies by separating intelligence analysts from other scientific disciplines. These conditions have had an effect on the self-concept of analysts and have molded the way analysts perceive their own identity. Finding: Analytic Identity The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process. George Mead. 17 25
Page 2 and 3: All statements of fact, opinion, or
Page 4 and 5: The Center for the Study of Intelli
Page 6 and 7: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are literall
Page 8 and 9: CONTENTS Foreword by Gregory F. Tre
Page 10 and 11: Part IV: Notes on Methodology Chapt
Page 12 and 13: as “CNN plus secrets.” Johnston
Page 14 and 15: INTRODUCTION ment, very open and ho
Page 16 and 17: INTRODUCTION is so small and the se
Page 18 and 19: INTRODUCTION gence analysts would u
Page 20 and 21: INTRODUCTION I mention Mead not onl
Page 22 and 23: eth•nog•ra•phy\n [F ethnograp
Page 24 and 25: CHAPTER ONE Definition 1: Intellige
Page 26 and 27: CHAPTER ONE that consumers of intel
Page 28 and 29: CHAPTER ONE During the interviews f
Page 30 and 31: CHAPTER TWO improvement infrastruct
Page 32 and 33: CHAPTER TWO Secrecy vs. Efficacy se
Page 34 and 35: CHAPTER TWO You know, someday someb
Page 36 and 37: CHAPTER TWO Finding: Rewards and In
Page 38 and 39: CHAPTER TWO distinction, for langua
Page 40 and 41: CHAPTER TWO that analysis is not a
Page 42 and 43: CHAPTER TWO described by participan
Page 46 and 47: CHAPTER TWO Asked to define their p
Page 48 and 49: CHAPTER TWO satisfaction and anxiet
Page 50 and 51: PART II Ethnography of Analysis 31
Page 52 and 53: CHAPTER THREE A Taxonomy of Intelli
Page 54 and 55: A TAXONOMY OF INTELLIGENCE ing inte
Page 56 and 57: A TAXONOMY OF INTELLIGENCE system t
Page 58 and 59: A TAXONOMY OF INTELLIGENCE cases an
Page 60 and 61: A TAXONOMY OF INTELLIGENCE Comparat
Page 62 and 63: A TAXONOMY OF INTELLIGENCE has on t
Page 64 and 65: CHAPTER FOUR Testing the Intelligen
Page 66 and 67: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE Syst
Page 68 and 69: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE an e
Page 70 and 71: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE rela
Page 72 and 73: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE ucts
Page 74 and 75: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE the
Page 76 and 77: TESTING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE shou
Page 78 and 79: CHAPTER FIVE Integrating Methodolog
Page 80 and 81: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS ing ches
Page 82 and 83: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS good as,
Page 84 and 85: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS case sti
Page 86 and 87: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS cal infr
Page 88 and 89: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS Can Tech
Page 90 and 91: INTEGRATING METHODOLOGISTS done to
Page 92 and 93: CHAPTER SIX have different historie
Page 94 and 95:
CHAPTER SIX As an observer, I misse
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CHAPTER SIX In contrast, 25 percent
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CHAPTER SIX numerous domain matter
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CHAPTER SIX Quite the contrary, eac
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CHAPTER SIX a practical matter, the
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CHAPTER SEVEN Background The argume
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CHAPTER SEVEN age about 30 percent,
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CHAPTER SEVEN the procedure’s app
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CHAPTER SEVEN includes the ability
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CHAPTER SEVEN advance beyond the co
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CHAPTER EIGHT is the process of lea
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CHAPTER EIGHT often be hired on the
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CHAPTER EIGHT Interestingly, resear
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CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion and Recomm
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CHAPTER EIGHT research fellowships,
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CHAPTER NINE As the resources avail
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CHAPTER NINE For intelligence analy
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CHAPTER NINE analyses requires sign
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CHAPTER NINE Development and Valida
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CHAPTER NINE agents or agencies of
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CHAPTER TEN Survey Methodology This
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SURVEY METHODOLOGY content and, thu
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SURVEY METHODOLOGY might merely ser
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SURVEY METHODOLOGY group includes a
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CHAPTER ELEVEN Q-Sort Methodology O
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CHAPTER TWELVE The “File-Drawer
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CHAPTER TWELVE 0.15 and for interac
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APPENDIX Jonathan Lockwood and K. L
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APPENDIX Hede Helfrich, “Human Re
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Published Sources Akin
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Camerer, Colin, and Er
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Endsley, M.R. “Desig
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Godson, Roy, ed. Compa
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Jervis, Robert. Percep
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ———, and Barbara
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Miller, George, and Ph
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ———. “The Pros
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Thompson, J. R., R. Ho
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Web resources Buros In
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sealed, world of intelligence. Rob
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