Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA

FINDINGS
seems most probable and, consequently, is easiest to support. As this strategy
is also the most time-efficient technique, it reduces the time constraints associated
with the daily production cycle.
This tendency to search for confirmatory data is not necessarily a conscious
choice; rather, it is the result of accepting an existing set of hypotheses, developing
a mental model based on previous corporate products, and then trying to
augment that model with current data in order to support the existing hypotheses.
Although motivational and heuristic factors and a tendency toward
“groupthink” might contribute to confirmatory behavior in intelligence analysis,
my observations and interviews during this study suggest that the predominant
influence is selectivity bias in order to maintain a corporate judgment.
The maintenance of a corporate judgment is a pervasive and often-unstated
norm in the Intelligence Community, and the taboo against changing the corporate
product line contributes to confirmation biases. Once any intelligence
agency has given its official opinion to policymakers, there exists a taboo
about reversing or significantly changing the official or corporate position to
avoid the loss of status, trust, or respect. Often, policymakers perceive a
change in judgment as though the original opinion was wrong, and, although
unstated, there are significant internal and external social pressures and consequences
associated with being perceived as incorrect.
An analyst can change an opinion based on new information or by revisiting
old information with a new hypothesis; in so doing, however, he or she
perceives a loss of trust and respect among those with whom the original judgment
was shared. Along with this perceived loss of trust, the analyst senses a
loss of social capital, or power, within his or her group. 15
It is even more difficult for an intelligence agency to change its official
position once it has made its judgments known to those outside of the organization.
There is a sense that changing the official product line will be seen outside
of its context—the acquisition of new information, for instance—and that
it will be perceived by the policymakers as an example of incompetence or, at
least, of poor performance on the part of the intelligence agency.
This perception then carries with it the threat of a loss in status, funding,
and access to policymakers, all of which would have a detrimental effect on
the ability of the intelligence agency to perform its functions. In short, it
serves the interest of the intelligence agency to be perceived as decisive
15
Reciprocity in this case has to do with information, judgment, and trust. The classic anthropological
text on social reciprocity and trust within and between groups is Marcel Mauss’s The Gift.
Originally published in 1950 and based in part on the work of his uncle and mentor, Emile
Durkheim, Mauss’s work (Essai sur le Don in its French version) lays the foundation for his contention
that reciprocity is the key to understanding the modern concept of social capital.
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