Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA
Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA
Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (PDF) - CIA
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CHAPTER FIVE<br />
to human biases to expla<strong>in</strong> unreliable expert predictions. 21 There is general<br />
agreement that two types of bias exist:<br />
• Pattern bias: look<strong>in</strong>g for evidence that confirms ra<strong>the</strong>r than rejects a<br />
hypo<strong>the</strong>sis and/or fill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>—perhaps <strong>in</strong>advertently—miss<strong>in</strong>g data with<br />
data from previous experiences;<br />
• Heuristic bias: us<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>appropriate guidel<strong>in</strong>es or rules to make predictions.<br />
Paradoxically, <strong>the</strong> very method by which one becomes an expert expla<strong>in</strong>s<br />
why experts are much better than novices at describ<strong>in</strong>g, expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, perform<strong>in</strong>g<br />
tasks, and solv<strong>in</strong>g problems with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir doma<strong>in</strong>s but, with few exceptions,<br />
are worse at forecast<strong>in</strong>g than are Bayesian probabilities based on<br />
historical, statistical models. A given doma<strong>in</strong> has specific heuristics for perform<strong>in</strong>g<br />
tasks and solv<strong>in</strong>g problems, and <strong>the</strong>se rules are a large part of what<br />
makes up expertise. In addition, experts need to acquire and store tens of thousands<br />
of cases <strong>in</strong> order to recognize patterns, generate and test hypo<strong>the</strong>ses, and<br />
contribute to <strong>the</strong> collective knowledge with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir fields. In o<strong>the</strong>r words,<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g an expert requires a significant number of years of view<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong><br />
world through <strong>the</strong> lens of one specific doma<strong>in</strong>. This concentration gives <strong>the</strong><br />
expert <strong>the</strong> power to recognize patterns, perform tasks, and solve problems, but<br />
it also focuses <strong>the</strong> expert’s attention on one doma<strong>in</strong> to <strong>the</strong> exclusion of o<strong>the</strong>rs.<br />
It should come as little surprise, <strong>the</strong>n, that an expert would have difficulty<br />
identify<strong>in</strong>g and weigh<strong>in</strong>g variables <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary task, such as forecast<strong>in</strong>g<br />
an adversary’s <strong>in</strong>tentions. Put differently, an expert may know his specific<br />
doma<strong>in</strong>, such as economics or leadership analysis, quite thoroughly, but<br />
that may still not permit him to div<strong>in</strong>e an adversary’s <strong>in</strong>tention, which <strong>the</strong><br />
adversary may not himself know.<br />
The Burden on <strong>Intelligence</strong> Analysts<br />
<strong>Intelligence</strong> analysis is an amalgam of a number of highly specialized<br />
doma<strong>in</strong>s. With<strong>in</strong> each, experts are tasked with assembl<strong>in</strong>g, analyz<strong>in</strong>g, assign<strong>in</strong>g<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g to, and report<strong>in</strong>g on data, <strong>the</strong> goals be<strong>in</strong>g to describe an event or<br />
observation, solve a problem, or make a forecast. Experts who encounter a<br />
case outside <strong>the</strong>ir field repeat <strong>the</strong> steps <strong>the</strong>y <strong>in</strong>itially used to acquire <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
expertise. Thus, <strong>the</strong>y can try to make <strong>the</strong> new data fit a pattern previously<br />
acquired; recognize that <strong>the</strong> case falls outside <strong>the</strong>ir expertise and turn to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
doma<strong>in</strong>’s heuristics to try to give mean<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> data; acknowledge that <strong>the</strong><br />
21<br />
J. Evans, Bias <strong>in</strong> Human Reason<strong>in</strong>g; R. Heuer, Psychology of <strong>Intelligence</strong> Analysis; D. Kahneman,<br />
P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, Judgment Under Uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty; A. Tversky and D. Kahneman,<br />
“The Belief <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> ‘Law of Small Numbers’.”<br />
66