Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

ABM system. According to information that became
available long after the initial bilateral debates, negotiations
and agreements on the offensive-defensive
linkage, feasibility studies ordered by the Soviets at
the time resulted in a definite conclusion that such a
system would not only be prohibitively expensive but
would also be totally ineffective and could be easily
penetrated in a massive nuclear attack. 11
Therefore Moscow decided at an early stage that
it would not waste resources on constructing such a
system. To be absolutely certain that the United States
would under no circumstances achieve a technological
breakthrough in defensive systems where the Soviets
anticipated failure, thereby gaining strategic superiority
over the USSR, they agreed to conclude the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). The complete reversal
of the Kremlin’s initial skeptical attitude towards
regulating strategic defensive systems was based on
pragmatic calculations. Establishing a moratorium on
developing strategic defensive systems that lasted until
the early 2000s may be considered a serious Soviet
achievement in arms control.
With the conclusion in May 1972 of the ABM
Treaty and SALT-1, the paradigm of “Mutual Assured
Destruction” (MAD) became dominant in U.S.-Soviet
strategic relations. 12 Negotiations on subsequent major
arms limitation and arms reduction treaties (SALT-
2, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] I and
START II) were conducted with the background of
continued reliance on mutual vulnerability to retaliation.
The Russians proclaimed the ABMT “the cornerstone
of strategic stability” in bilateral relations and
the foundation of geopolitical “parity” between the
superpowers. 13 Diplomatic experiences of the early-
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