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Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

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combined. 23 The prestigious General Staff Academy<br />

had its 17 chairs reduced to two (the art of war <strong>and</strong><br />

national security <strong>and</strong> defense) <strong>and</strong> instead of its usual<br />

100-120 annual graduates, admitted only 16 students<br />

at the one-star level in 2009-10. These were taught a<br />

revised curriculum (for example, students no longer<br />

needed to study the division). 24<br />

It is also worth noting that, just as President Medvedev<br />

<strong>and</strong> Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are commonly<br />

referred to as the ruling “t<strong>and</strong>em,” so too in defense<br />

terms there is also an effective t<strong>and</strong>em: Serdyukov <strong>and</strong><br />

Makarov. The latter had his service extended by presidential<br />

decree after reaching retirement age (60) in<br />

October 2009. This partnership between the first truly<br />

civilian <strong>Russian</strong> defense minister (Sergei Ivanov was a<br />

former Federal Security Service (Federal’naya Sluzhba<br />

Bezopasnosti) [FSB] officer) <strong>and</strong> the Chief of the General<br />

Staff (CGS) may well be instrumental in promoting<br />

<strong>and</strong> conducting the reform, but it would be misleading<br />

to characterize the reform as being the work of a<br />

small or maverick elite: it simply could not be enacted<br />

without the active participation of many other actors;<br />

particularly the siloviki (military politicians).<br />

Contradictions <strong>and</strong> Challenges.<br />

Almost 2 years into the reform, numerous contradictions<br />

<strong>and</strong> challenges have surfaced. How can such<br />

high levels of readiness be achieved if the manning of<br />

such brigades is mostly based upon 12-month-service<br />

conscripts? Is this enough time to train <strong>and</strong> achieve<br />

necessary st<strong>and</strong>ards? There is no consensus within the<br />

defense ministry <strong>and</strong> General Staff on the precise nature<br />

of the manning system: a widespread recognition<br />

that the experiment with contract personnel has failed<br />

39

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