Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

goals and the promise “to extend a hand if others are
willing to unclench their fist,” 122 both sides rushed to
renew strategic arms control negotiations on a followon
agreement to START I 123 and broader areas of cooperation
to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
and prevent further proliferation in accordance with
joint statements issued by President Obama and Russian
President Dmitrii Medvedev in London on April
1, 2009. 124
The signing of the new START agreement brought
many in Moscow to near-euphoria. In Russian eyes, it
vindicated Russian adherence to MAD and the linkage
between strategic offensive and defensive weapons,
and carried a promise of limiting the U.S. global
BMD effort, especially as far as deployments close
to Russian borders are concerned. The Kremlin will
most probably be able to assure the treaty’s ratification
in the State Duma where it enjoys a comfortable
majority (both countries need to proceed to the ratification
simultaneously). The situation in the United
States, where many question the basic MAD-oriented
premise of the treaty, the ultimate value it may have
for U.S. security, and the direction it gives to U.S. nuclear
strategy, may be very different. 125 In case START
ratification stalls or the treaty fails to enter into force
altogether, the Russian Federation may experience
an upsurge in anti-Americanism. This is bound to be
reflected at some stage in Russia rewriting its military
and foreign policy guidelines. Even if the treaty
is ratified, Russia may change its attitude towards it
depending on the on-going U.S. BMD programs in Europe
and other regions in accordance with Moscow’s
clarifying statement on missile defense at the signing
of START. 126
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