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Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

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any such intent. In July 2010, Aleks<strong>and</strong>r Postnikov,<br />

the comm<strong>and</strong>er of Russia’s Ground Forces, told Ekho<br />

Moskvy radio that the <strong>Russian</strong> military was deploying<br />

the Isk<strong>and</strong>er near St. Petersburg. From there, they<br />

could hit targets in Estonia, Latvia, <strong>and</strong> Finl<strong>and</strong>. 44<br />

STRATEGY AND TACTICS<br />

At a minimum, <strong>Russian</strong> nuclear forces aim to<br />

prevent the United States or any other country from<br />

launching a major attack against <strong>Russian</strong> territory.<br />

This requirement is likely to persist for at least the<br />

next decade. In late 2006, Putin told <strong>Russian</strong> military<br />

leaders that the country’s “deterrent forces should be<br />

able to guarantee the neutralization of any potential<br />

aggressor, no matter what modern weapons systems<br />

he possesses.” 45 <strong>Russian</strong> nuclear planners most likely<br />

concentrate their planning <strong>and</strong> resources on surviving<br />

a war with the United States, since such a capability<br />

should provide the assets that Russia would need to<br />

defeat weaker nuclear adversaries (e.g., Britain, China,<br />

or France). <strong>Russian</strong> strategists most fear an American<br />

attempt to decapitate the <strong>Russian</strong> leadership through a<br />

surprise attack involving U.S. nuclear <strong>and</strong> conventional<br />

attacks against Russia’s centralized comm<strong>and</strong>-<strong>and</strong>control<br />

networks <strong>and</strong> against its nuclear forces when<br />

they are on their lower peacetime alert status. They<br />

worry that American leaders might anticipate crippling<br />

the <strong>Russian</strong> military response by incapacitating<br />

Russia’s political <strong>and</strong> military decisionmakers before<br />

they could organize a coherent retaliatory strike. Such<br />

a hypothetical attack could employ SLBMs with depressed<br />

trajectories from Trident submarines on patrol<br />

near Russia, or stealthy conventional weapons that<br />

would exploit weaknesses in Russia’s early warning<br />

383

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