Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize
nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass destruction
against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation involving the
use of conventional weapons when the very existence
of the state is under threat. (Section III.22). 80
As if to stress still further the level of extreme caution
involved, the doctrine also adds: “The decision
to utilize nuclear weapons is made by the Russian
Federation president.” Its inclusion seems calibrated
to remind the military that the decision rests with the
supreme political leadership. Despite the controversy
in the fall of 2009, the doctrine did not adopt a more
aggressive nuclear posture, suggesting that a struggle
occurred in the hiatus resulting in the victory of more
moderate forces in the Russian security elite. 81 While
there was a fudge on the issue of the new look, on
the nuclear issue and foreign procurement the hawks
were plucked and their hopes for rapid feather growth
lay in questioning whether the new look will prove
successful in the future and in clinging dogmatically
to nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, the new doctrine
subsequently allowed slightly more scope to those
advocating reform to openly discuss the “teething”
problems of the new look armed forces.
PANDORA’S BOX AND GROWING
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC CONFUSION
This uneasy consensus reflected in the new military
doctrine, which appears weighed in favor of old
approaches, manifests itself in a curious way in the
country’s nuclear posture. Military justification for
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