29.08.2014 Views

Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

U.S nuclear weapons during the Cold War was to support<br />

the “coupling” of American <strong>and</strong> NATO European<br />

strategic commitments against Soviet intimidation<br />

or nuclear blackmail. Now decades beyond the Cold<br />

War, leading military experts <strong>and</strong> politicians within<br />

NATO Europe have recommended that these weapons<br />

should be removed <strong>and</strong> dismantled. 34<br />

Both the political <strong>and</strong> military rationales for U.S.<br />

sub-strategic weapons deployed in allied NATO<br />

states have been called into question. The political<br />

rationale of deterrence “coupling” seems beside the<br />

point if NATO <strong>and</strong> Russia are no longer declared or<br />

de facto enemies. The military rationale, or the need<br />

for a tactical nuclear option as part of an escalation<br />

“ladder” that would allow NATO to skirmish with<br />

Russia in increments, but short of total war, dem<strong>and</strong>s<br />

nuanced performance from comm<strong>and</strong>, control, <strong>and</strong><br />

communications (C3) systems, <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ers on<br />

both sides. Otherwise escalation control turns into<br />

mutual confusion. Although current <strong>Russian</strong> military<br />

doctrine stipulates that NATO is a “danger” instead of<br />

a “threat,” <strong>Russian</strong> military concerns about a NATO<br />

conventional first strike option near Russia or within<br />

its state territory argue against a long pause between<br />

rungs of its escalation ladder. 35<br />

Some <strong>Russian</strong> strategists support the use of a small<br />

number of tactical nuclear weapons for the de-escalation<br />

of a conventional war based on the shock value of<br />

a nuclear “first use” option to obtain a favorable war<br />

termination. But such a use, as opposed to the threat<br />

of nuclear force employment, could backfire, causing<br />

a retaliatory <strong>and</strong> larger escalation by the opponent. 36<br />

As Pavel Baev noted, “deficiencies in Russia’s conventional<br />

military forces might increase the appeal of<br />

nuclear weapons under the exigent circumstances of<br />

430

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!