Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

the Chinese. Moreover, they do not possess sensorfused
cluster munitions, though in theory their surface
to surface missiles (SSM’s) could deliver cluster
munitions depending on whether the missile troops
remained intact long enough. Faced with an advancing
PLA division or divisions, early use of TNW would
present a viable option.
In February 2010, Aleksey Arbatov, the Head of
the Moscow-based World Economics and International
Relations Institute of the Center for International
Security, explained that such weapons are for Moscow,
“the chief guarantee for maintaining a balance of
forces with the United States,” adding: “Considering
the colossal U.S. superiority in conventional weapons
and the growing lag above all in delivery vehicles of
the strategic forces, the role of TNW only grows as an
instrument of foreign policy.” Yet, the military significance
of the tactical weapons is far eclipsed by the issue
of how to verify and monitor any binding joint reductions,
since, as he admits, this is in order of magnitude
much more complex than any reduction in strategic
nuclear forces. “Technically it is practically impossible
to verify a reduction,” he suggested. “While intercontinental
missiles simply can be destroyed, you cannot
do it so simply with dual-purpose delivery systems,”
Arbatov believes, pointing out that frontal aviation artillery
and the navy can be equipped with such capabilities,
but monitoring their storage facilities would
be “unprecedented.” 83
Colonel-General (Retired) Viktor Yesin, a former
Chief of the Main Staff of the RVSN, linking recent assurances
over U.S. BMD plans with the possible future
participation of Russia, expressed the need for caution
on the part of Moscow:
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