Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

even contains self-contradictory statements, offering
little clarity on the nature of warfare or threats that
the armed forces should be prepared to meet. Parts
of its content simply make no sense whatsoever. One
example of this confused approach, which exposes the
dichotomy between the doctrine and Serdyukov’s military
reform, can be demonstrated by the latter having
abolished the mass mobilization principle as a result of
the organizational transformation in the armed forces
in 2009, while the former document mentions “mobilize”
or “mobilization” more than 50 times. The 2000
doctrine specified the role of the General Staff in terms
of command and control, also referring to the function
of the defense ministry and the military districts. All
this has been jettisoned in the new doctrine and in its
place there is a vacuum. The new doctrine notes the
potential hazard posed by information warfare and
the need for the state to possess the means to conduct
such operations, yet information warfare is largely
ignored in the doctrine, while its only counterpart
(The Information Security Doctrine, 2000) now appears
somewhat dated. The “balance,” if this was what was
intended on the part of those drafting the doctrine, is
in reality a sea of confusion, in which the military are
tossed to and fro and any sense of strategy is left helplessly
sinking. Long-term trends, clear guidance, or
nuanced interpretation in this context must be treated
cautiously and often with multiple caveats.
The sense of strategic disconnect contained in the
new military doctrine is perhaps better understood by
examining certain features of its content coupled with
how the document was formulated, noting which actors
were involved, and finally linking the doctrine to
the actual condition of the conventional armed forces.
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