Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

weapons guarantee Russia’s security and sovereignty.
Hence, opposition to missile defense amounts to more
than just a straightforward military calculation. The
issue has become emotionally charged and suspicions
now matter more than cool-headed assessment.
Virulent, often hysterical Russian opposition to
the George W. Bush plans to build a limited strategic
defense capability in Europe has demonstrated two
underlying and intertwining trends that make conflict
almost inevitable.
The first trend is the multiple capabilities of a system
designed to protect the United States against Iranian
or North Korean missiles. The same assets could
theoretically intercept Russian missiles as well, and
that residual capability conveniently feeds into the
concern about the credibility of strategic deterrence.
Almost no one in Russia believed the official justification
provided by the Bush administration because,
according to Russian military’s estimates, Iran will not
acquire missiles with strategic range for many years.
Hence, Russians tried to imagine the “real” purpose
of the planned missile defense and, not surprisingly,
concluded it was intended against Russia—worst-case
planning and suspicions still to a large extent rule the
day in Moscow. Washington’s assurances that the system
would be limited were not taken seriously—the
planned deployment was regarded as a “foot in the
door,” with the first 10 interceptors supplemented by
dozens more at a later stage.
A further complication was the manner and style
of Russian rhetoric, which almost always failed to
clearly convey the true nature of concern—it was not
about the system the Bush administration planned, but
rather about its possible expansion in the future. Russian
statements were usually devoted to short-range
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