Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

interference. In political terms, it not only represents a
“no go” sign for potential enemies, it also is an attempt
to intimidate NATO allies by making them targets of
Russian nuclear strikes if they try to invoke Article V
of the Washington Treaty should Russia move on the
Baltic States or undertake similar kinds of attacks.
In those remarks, we see a hidden or at least an
unnoticed mission for Russia’s nuclear weapons. They
serve to demarcate its sphere of influence by setting
up a “no go” zone for foreign military entities, because
the Russian elite almost unanimously believes that
without such weapons, the whole of the CIS would be
open to NATO intervention in a crisis. Thus, if Russia
is to have a sphere of influence in the region, it must
extend its deterrence umbrella throughout that sphere
to make its claim credible and with that its claim to
great or even superpower status.
Neither is Russia’s professed readiness to use nuclear
weapons confined to land-based systems. Vice-
Admiral Oleg Burtsev, the Navy’s Deputy Chief of
Staff, told RIA Novosti that: “Probably, tactical nuclear
weapons will play a key role in the future,” and that
the Navy may fit new, less powerful nuclear warheads
to the existing types of cruise missiles. “There
is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful
nuclear warheads,” Burtsev said. “We can install lowyield
warheads [possibly fusion weapons?] on existing
cruise missiles.” 104 This is clearly something that
creates an unacceptable threat to European security. 105
Certainly, we cannot assume this to be mere rhetoric,
for as Bildt has told us, Russia has already deployed
TNW on its Baltic Fleet ships. 106 In apparent confirmation
of Bildt’s remarks, the following episode from
2006 is informative.
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