Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

tially hostile forces in both the east and west. Therefore,
they are very loath to any further reduction of
nuclear missiles. Indeed, many of them still express
the idea of repealing the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty and building INFs and intermediate
range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to counter this
threat. 71 As if on cue, Lavrov immediately afterwards
called for, as have previous supporters of repeal of the
INF treaty, a universal treaty banning intermediate
and short-range missiles, a propaganda point if there
ever was one, but one aimed also at China, not just the
West. 72
Consequently, Russian demands for nuclear weapons
also relate to the fact that Moscow cannot conceive
of defending itself against the threats it perceives,
mainly from NATO, but also from China, without
continuing to build, renew, and modernize nuclear
weapons. Its capacity for doing so is visibly open to
debate, a fact that creates many dilemmas for Russia’s
strategic leadership. Certainly its continuing program
to build new nuclear missiles and usable nuclear
weapons like low-yield and fusion weapons and the
RS-24 (Yars) missile shows what it thinks of President
Obama’s quest for a global zero for nuclear weapons,
as does the new doctrine’s expectation that there will
be more nuclear powers by 2020. 73 Therefore, it regards
any U.S. missile defense, whether in Europe or
Asia, as being a constant threat to its strategic stability
and vital interests.
Second, Russia’s military is clearly unwilling to
accept the notion of that there is no linkage between
offensive and defensive weapons. It claims that the
United States reshaped its missile defense posture
in Europe in September 2009, “because, according to
our clear assessment, this area would definitely cre-
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