Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

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2005, two more are close to completion). These and other submarines are equipped with dual-capable cruise missiles, both those intended against other ships and against land targets. As mentioned above, the Navy seeks to maintain its nuclear capability, especially visà-vis U.S. Navy, but conventional assets play an increasingly visible role in the long-term plans. The pace of conventional rearmament is set to increase following the “5-day war,” the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Russia won this conflict largely due to the sheer size of the army it sent to battle. Speaking in September 2008, Dmitri Medvedev declared: We must achieve superiority in the air, in high-precision strikes against land and sea targets, in quick relocation of troops. . . . By 2020, we must solve the problem of . . . comprehensive equipment of forces with new models of arms and reconnaissance assets. 77 More than 2 decades of work on GLONASS, which should allow precision guidance for conventional weapons, is gradually coming to completion as well. It currently features 21 satellites allowing coverage of Russia’s own territory, with two or three satellites for each location; launch of six additional satellites is planned for 2010. The system is still inferior to GPS— the accuracy of its coordinates in Russian territory is reported to be six meters, several times worse than for GPS, but on the other hand its characteristics are gradually improving—in 2009 it was 10 meters. 78 One of the main drawbacks of Soviet satellites that necessitates frequent replacement of satellites in orbit—short life span—is also slowly improving. A new satellite was introduced several years ago, and in 2010 Russia plans to launch the first satellites that will last 7 243
or more years. Given multiple delays and the Russian propensity to overestimate the ability to deliver new products, GLONASS will probably reach full functionality only in the second half of the coming decade. While Russian efforts to acquire long-range conventional capability seem to mirror what the United States has been doing for over 20 years, there is an important asymmetry that could complicate finding a common language. In contrast to Global Strike, which emphasizes strategic ranges because potential targets are located in southern Eurasia (Middle East, South Asia, etc.), Russia is developing a theater-level conventional capability. Ironically, American and Russian targets, if not the same, at least overlap, but Russia is simply closer to these targets. Furthermore, assets the United States needs to strike in the areas of ongoing and potential conflicts could also be used against Russia, which will remain a source of unending concern for Moscow, whereas Russian theater-range assets will not be able to strike the United States. Thus, Russian military and civilian experts will continue to voice concern about Global Strike. This concern could be alleviated somewhat through a set of confidence building measures, but hardly removed completely, at least not in the foreseeable future. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INF The 1987 INF Treaty has never been particularly liked by the Russian military. It is closely associated with major concessions on part of the Soviet Union, which had to eliminate many more missiles in that class than the United States. Characteristically, the security benefits the Soviet Union obtained from that deal (removal of American missiles with very short flight- 244
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Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Pres
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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Part III 6. Caught between Scylla a
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INTRODUCTION As of November 2010, t
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future reductions to a 1,000 warhea
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CHAPTER 1 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AND CONVE
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States (CIS). For a number of reaso
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with nuclear weapons alone. General
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cratic politics that Kvashnin revel
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PUTIN AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF
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sequences flowing therefrom.” 22
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its rightful conclusion.” 29 In t
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The words about the priority of nuc
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If the constant failures by the Bul
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LONG-RANGE AVIATION Using the one o
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prepare themselves against.” 51 A
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that day the directorates were enga
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USING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO O
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2. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Russia’s
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28. “Hope Glimmers for Reform,”
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53. “The Military Doctrine of the
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mittee, and Viktor Ozerov, the Head
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1,107 as of September 1, 2008, to 8
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Implementation. Chief of the Genera
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has not been followed by any obviou
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ficers compared with society and th
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Many of these challenges are unlike
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Institute, examined some of these i
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of brigades in the table of organiz
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The performance of the brigades, fo
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employment will be effective when t
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RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 2010: “
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The Search for the “New:” Defin
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on states; individual states violat
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almost verbatim. The third threat,
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ministry working group. Army-Genera
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Nuclear Posture and Redrafting. Des
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Medvedev. 67 Although much of the d
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identifying the intentions and fore
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The Russian Federation reserves the
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the Chinese. Moreover, they do not
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United States, Russia is in a diffe
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mankind to the brink of a nuclear c
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Tactical Nuclear Reduction Talks as
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as among Alliance members, future B
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in Krasnaya Zvezda. Their proposal
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fearing that, unless handled sensit
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of strategic engagement with Russia
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6. Baranets, “The Army Will Be Ge
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28. “Putin Chairs Meeting in Voro
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44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Voyennaya D
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Visits Abu Dhabi Arms Show, Talks o
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Nuclear Development Concerns Russia
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CHAPTER 3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA
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tary and foreign policy, many polit
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In June 1967, U.S. President Lyndon
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1970s had long-term effects on late
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ons aimed at satellites. 17 Clearly
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educing strategic armaments and eve
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Internationally, the RF earned a du
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itary-political relations with West
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The situation in the armed forces t
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The Russian Federation reserves the
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In the latter case, they expected o
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As seen by a Russian expert: In mid
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facilitate the elimination of weapo
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Putin saw added opportunities for p
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the expanded uses of nuclear weapon
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sures” to counter the U.S. BMD an
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and NATO provocations.” In partic
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econsider its key postulates. Alrea
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CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITI
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eady developing the theory of strat
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termination of the Cold War and the
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goals and the promise “to extend
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• Reforms of the army, law-enforc
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5. Andrei A. Gromyko, “To Be Reme
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29. “Yeltsin Rattles Nuclear Sabr
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45. Vladimir Putin, “Opening Addr
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62. See Amy F. Woolf, “Anti-Balli
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71. “Sergei Ivanov: Russia is for
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90. Vladimir Ivanov, “Iskanders A
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lish%2FDefence_Arms_13%2FRussia_s_D
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125. See Keith B. Payne, “Disarma
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The positive shift in relations coi
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and in other public statements that
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tagonist of the cause for dismantli
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mobilization. 11 It is possible to
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Since the collapse of the Union of
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avoid the need to act on this rheto
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the technology behind its modern ai
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duumvirate might be modified or aba
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to be non-negotiable. Putin believe
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Such a hard-driven Russia might tur
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10. A more detailed analysis of thi
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analysis can be found in Aleksei Ar
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CHAPTER 5 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA
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ery vehicles is apparently below th
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out as to whether it will be able t
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Page 212 and 213: as reduced-noise submarines. In pos
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Page 220 and 221: 2010 AND INTO THE FUTURE The new, t
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Page 224 and 225: Force, whose leaders rarely if ever
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Page 230 and 231: tiatives aimed at reducing the Russ
Page 232 and 233: The pace and the success rate for e
Page 234 and 235: Even more remote is the plan to dev
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Page 238 and 239: tion of that leg was still minimal.
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Page 246 and 247: Quite paradoxically, another, equal
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Page 258 and 259: from Alaska, “but they will not b
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Page 262 and 263: 5. Roman Dobrokhotov, “Obezoruzhi
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Page 272 and 273: CHAPTER 6 CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA AND
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Page 290 and 291: the fact that the economy and infra
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Page 294 and 295: There are aspects to their nuclear
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policy context, suggests that very
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Indeed, from Boldyrev’s remarks w
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systems, our partners may come to f
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increased purchases of weapons and
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naval bases. 27 Yet the defense sec
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state expenditures will supposedly
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT Beyon
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Not only did Serdyukov accept this
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the Strategic Missile (Rocket) Forc
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fight using such weapons. Consequen
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the global and regional levels enta
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ate risks for Russia.” 74 But sin
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Neither is this just rhetoric. As o
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Since then Deputy Foreign Minister
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The radical changes that have occur
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tary’s viewpoint. Patrushev told
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In responding to a question from Pu
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strike even in a preventive or pree
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longer guarantee a retaliatory resp
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tive entourages. Such trends are da
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standpoint its perception is a vali
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this problem and make the Fleet Rus
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tedly self-inflated status that it
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The following analysis from 2004 to
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Consequently, 162 Vasilenko also st
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inferiority vis-à-vis U.S. and Chi
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eductions will continue. Most likel
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If Russian leaders are to decrease
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14. “Failure to build a professio
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37. Moscow, Russia, Interfax-AVN On
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59. Open Source Committee, OSC Anal
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78. Open Source Center, “Russians
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99. “Russia To Allocate $35.3 Bil
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121. Jussi Kontinen, “Russia Plan
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143. Litovkin, “We Didn’t Send
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nid Ivashov on Russian Foreign Poli
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Sixth, Russian policymakers can iss
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U.S. surface ships and attack subma
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arsenal, as well as approximately a
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the Russian military has continued
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heads, instead it is possible to ma
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it endangers the Russian state (a p
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particular, Russian Government repr
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Poland will once again come under i
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to host U.S. BMD facilities, Russia
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systems. U.S. ballistic missile and
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Russian Government abandoned its de
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Later that year, Putin told leading
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a U.S.-NATO attack. In his May 2006
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The Obama administration also decid
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treaty monitoring by prohibiting ac
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The main Russian military newspaper
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more secure locations. 80 Russian o
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Any proposals for increased transpa
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emaining props of Russia’s great
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many and Japan in the generations a
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2010, available from news.kremlin.r
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32. Cited in Peter Finn, “Antimis
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48. Viktor Myasnikov, Vladimir Ivan
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asp?SHORTCUT=695; John Edwards and
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81. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
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CHAPTER 9 NEW START AND NONPROLIFER
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number of launchers to a maximum of
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U.S. plan for missile defenses depl
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tual deployment of weapons for conv
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and Air Force. 20 Russia’s need f
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war. The conflict also served as a
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Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea,
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perceived battlefield desperation.
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(CBT); to mobilize international su
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linear to nonlinear strategies for
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Data Analysis. Current and New STAR
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Using the numbers in Table 3-1 as p
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Figure 9-2. Russian Surviving and R
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The results summarized in Figures 9
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intended as predictions of actual f
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CONCLUSION New START and other mani
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ty,” Opening Statement before the
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Talbott, “A better base for cutti
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20. Dale R. Herspring, “Putin, Me
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35. “Military dangers” create c
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and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New
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CHAPTER 10 RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POSTU
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Russian foreign policy commentary o
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jor component of Russia’s geostra
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many in 1941, Gareev pointed to the
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By the spring of 2009, a number of
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structures, early warning systems,
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ghanistan, were part of an effort t
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design bureau in Moscow and the pro
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weapons by India and Pakistan in 19
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Kuril islands. In both Manchuria an
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There were, of course, all sorts of
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Australian experts concluded was fi
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however, Chinese military moderniza
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cise, General Makarov stated that:
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commitment to make Russia into an i
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cruiser Petr Velikii to observe a m
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as effectively defenseless against
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nal threats, but the real problem i
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cused Khramchikhin of “playing wi
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that included not only the Russian
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27. Aleksandr’ Kondrat’ev, “N
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47. This process has been addressed
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66. Aleksandr’ Khramhikhin. “Ne
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terly journal, Security Dialogue, a
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editor of Military Affairs, as assi
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and the Institute of World Economy
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE This Publicat
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