Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

strike even in a preventive or preemptive mode, and
this would supposedly force NATO to negotiate a political
solution that allows Russia to hold onto at least
some of its gains. Apart from the immensity of Moscow’s
gamble that NATO will not have the stomach
to retaliate against Russian nuclear strikes, which will
be carried out to inflict a “preset” amount of damage
that Moscow believes will signal its “limited” intent.
In essence, Moscow is essentially engaging in a game
of nuclear chicken or blackmail. In fact, the real risk
here is that the West will not acquiesce but rather that
it will retaliate or even escalate, further adding to the
inherent unpredictability of any conceivable nuclear
war scenario.
A recent article by Vipin Narang analyzing Pakistan’s
nuclear posture outlined three differing nuclear
postures among the nuclear powers, i.e., their operational
rather than their rhetorical nuclear doctrine. It
is apparent that posture and doctrine generate deterrent
power against all potential enemies and can be
used to develop different levels of ability to deter
varying contingencies, as well as to induce nuclear
and other political forms of restraint among adversaries.
Russia’s nuclear posture which aims to deter both
conventional and nuclear threats through varying levels
of threatened response or first-strike use of nuclear
weapons exemplifies the process. 112 Russia’s declared
nuclear posture therefore falls into the category of an
“Asymmetric Escalation Posture.” This posture conforms
with numerous statements by Putin et al. that
Russia’s responses to U.S. missile defenses and NATO
enlargement will be asymmetric in nature, hence the
threat of a nuclear first-strike. This posture has the
following characteristics and entails the recommendations
that follow the portrayal of those characteristics
below.
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