Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

fearing that, unless handled sensitively, it may exacerbate
East European and Baltic clamor for greater
defense against Russia, or provide an opportunity to
further divide the United States and its allies in Europe.
Reluctantly dragged into bilateral talks aimed at
joint reduction of these weapons, Moscow would seek
to prolong such discussions, at least until the organizational
phase of its conventional reform is complete
(2012 at the earliest), and thereafter would attempt to
form linkages to other issues ranging from BMD and
CFE to its advocating a new European security treaty.
Indeed, some Russian commentators portrayed
the domestic German political dimension at play in
pushing for the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons
on German territory. Originally proposed in the fall
of 2009 by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle,
the leader of the Free Democratic Party in the
ruling coalition, who demanded such withdrawal in a
separate paragraph in the coalition treaty with Angela
Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Addressing the Munich
Security Conference in February 2010, Westerwelle
confirmed his intention to pursue the elimination of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Germany by 2013 (the end
of the ruling coalition’s period in office). It was also
noted that the Free Democratic Party is ideologically
opposed to nuclear energy in any form and advocate
withdrawing German troops from Afghanistan and
that Merkel most likely agreed to compromise on the
issue of nuclear weapons in order to preserve the German
presence in Afghanistan. 106
While Russian analysts recognized that START
III represented a key element within the reset policy
and, more importantly, the only forum within which
Moscow can hold discussions with Washington on an
equal footing, this translated neither into confidence
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