Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

In the latter case, they expected opponents, the United
States in particular, to recognize that Russia deserves
a “special place” in geopolitics by virtue of its military
and economic potential, size, history, and culture. 60
In an obvious demonstration of his readiness to
deflate tensions and fulfill Russia’s arms control obligations,
shortly after his formal election to the presidential
post, Vladimir Putin moved to expedite ratification
of the START II Treaty. On April 14, 2000, Putin
could master the majority of votes in the State Duma
in support of the Treaty. In assuring the ratification
that eluded his predecessor for many years, the new
Russian President was motivated as much by the desire
to bring the Russian legislature under his control
as by the need to avoid the image of a “weakling” in
the eyes of Washington.
However, Vladimir Putin and people around him
were evidently well aware of the serious misgivings
of the Russian military about START II. Almost from
the moment it was signed by Presidents Bill Clinton
and Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, many in the Russian
political elite and the expert community argued
against its ratification because allegedly it worked
against Russian interests and represented a “huge
concession” to the United States.
Moscow was also well aware that parallel to efforts
at making START II effective, the United States
was considering changes to or abrogation of the ABM
Treaty in order to implement its BMD programs.
Clearly, it was with Putin’s acquiescence that the State
Duma added a provision to its START II ratification
document stating that Russia would not be tied by this
or other arms control agreements if the ABM Treaty
was violated by the United States According to Russian
experts, “Thus, the link that Gorbachev failed to
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