Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

a positive first step toward a final solution. Effectively,
it bought time for a more constructive engagement,
and this is probably the maximum that could be done
at the current stage.
Nevertheless, the issue did not fade away completely.
While current plans are not a source of serious
concern, possible future capabilities still are. Chief of
General Staff Nikolai Makarov declared that U.S. missile
defense in its current shape and capability is not
a concern for Russia, but long-term plans to develop
strategic missile defense could become a threat. 66
According to Vladimir Dvorkin, “the crisis between
Russia and the United States over missile defense has
been postponed [by the signing of New START], but it
could return in an even more acute shape after the seabased
missile defense system built around SM-3 interceptors
and their ground-launched analogues acquire
strategic capability by 2020.” 67 That is, while the first
irritant—multiple capabilities—has been removed,
the other and more important one, predictability, still
needs to be addressed.
A complicating feature that has emerged during
the last decade was the emergence of close cooperation
between Russia and China in opposition to U.S. missile
defense plans. Both countries share many of the
same concerns and have jointly acted in almost every
conceivable international forum to oppose and derail
American plans. A turning point in that cooperation
was 2005, when Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared
that Russia and China both face the same threat
from U.S. missile defense plans. As a result, Russia’s
ability to find accommodation with the United States,
launch cooperative programs, etc., is now limited because
it could be seen by China as a betrayal.
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